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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Sarah H. Frost for the 
Master of Science in Sociology presented October 24, 1995. 
Title: Institutionalized Discrimination: Three Cases in 
the United States Military. 
This thesis explores institutionalized discrimination 
in the United States Military by examining the rationales 
given for policies that exclude, or limit the military 
service of racial minorities, women and homosexuals, and 
the rationales given for altering such policies. 
outgroups such as racial minorities, women and 
homosexuals are presumed to be a threat to the white male 
heterosexual majority within the military services. The 
presence of these outgroups in the military has been 
officially characterized as threatening to small-unit 
cohesion, and therefore threatening to military readiness. 
This thesis was first based upon the assumption that 
the rationales favoring discriminatory policies, and 
rationales favoring reform, would be expressed in the 
language of small-group theories of cohesion, that is, 
cohesion based upon the self-categorization of group 
members, or the interdependence of group members. 
However, in the data analysis process, two other 
rationales emerged: the ideological and the bureaucratic 
rationales. 
Data illustrating these four rationales were drawn 
from a content analysis of articles and other commentary 
published in the New York Times. Statements were cross-
tabulated by the stance (exclusionist or reformist) they 
supported and the rationale (self-categorical, inter-
dependent, ideological or bureaucratic) they employed to 
justify the stance. This analysis was first done 
separately for each of the three groups, racial 
minorities, women and homosexuals, and then the data for 
each of the three outgroups were compared and contrasted. 
2 
Findings indicate that despite the military's 
official characterization of outgroups as a threat to 
small-unit cohesion, relatively little of the debate was 
expressed in terms of small-group theories of cohesion--
the self-categorization of, or interdependence of group 
members. The most frequently employed rationales were, in 
fact, ideological in character. Between the three groups, 
however, some differences in patterns of rationales and 
stances emerged. 
The findings are placed in their historical and 
political contexts to help explain the results of the 
analysis, and to illuminate the experience of racial 
minorities, women and homosexuals in the United States 
military. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
The United States military is one of the country's 
oldest and largest bureaucratically organized social 
systems. While the bureaucratic model stresses the 
impersonal nature of that form of organization, personal 
characteristics and attitudes of members in fact affect 
organizational functioning (see, among others, Blau 1964; 
Homans 1958). Yet bureaucracies are predicated upon, and 
thrive on predictability. Characteristics and attitudes 
of members, because they cannot be controlled, become a 
potential liability for such organizations. 
As a bureaucratic organization the United States 
military must find ways to mitigate the unpredictable 
nature of social interaction among its members. The 
attempt to control the behavior of service members has led 
to (among other things) a pattern of discrimination 
against categories of people. Presumably, a more 
homogeneous service membership is viewed as more 
predictable. The U.S. military has always been composed 
mostly of white, male and presumably heterosexual 
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personnel. Because their presence might be deemed 
"offensive" to the majority, outgroups such as racial 
minorities, women and homosexuals are regarded as a threat 
to military discipline and morale, and therefore a threat 
to military readiness. Discrimination, in this context, 
is not so much an attempt to "keep down" its victims, as 
it is the result of taking the easiest route to reducing 
hostility between service members, thus reducing the 
threat to military readiness. The result, however, is the 
same-- unequal opportunity within the military, based upon 
categorical differences. 
Racial minorities, women, and homosexuals have 
historically encountered various types of discrimination 
within the U.S. military. The limits placed on their 
participation include (or have included) restrictions from 
particular military vocations and/or ranks, exclusions 
from certain military stations or installations, or 
complete exclusion from military service (Nalty 1986; Holm 
1982; Shilts 1993). 
Given the supposed impersonal nature of 
bureaucracies, the fact that the military has fiercely 
resisted the inclusion of people because of group 
characteristics appears anomalous. Discrimination by the 
military is a particularly dubious practice because the 
military's separate body of criminal law -- the Uniform 
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Code of Military Justice -- gives the organization 
unparalleled power to control the behavior of its members. 
Yet despite this power, the military has not chosen to 
enforce standards of behavior equally among service 
members. Instead, the possibility of hostile and 
inappropriate behaviors by one category of people toward 
another in the services has been "resolved" through 
institutionalized discrimination. 
Individual prejudices, of course, cannot be 
eliminated through bureaucratic wrangling or legislation. 
But the issue addressed here is not whether service 
members dislike or act out against one another because of 
their categorical differences. It is acknowledged that 
prejudice, and resultant discriminatory behaviors, exist 
among service members. The more important fact is that 
the military itself institutionalizes discrimination from 
the top of the organization on down. Discrimination is 
codified, both in federal law and in service regulations. 
In other words, to not discriminate against certain 
categories of people has been, and still is, a breach of 
the organizational rules (Department of Defense directive 
[hereafter DOD dir] 1332.14; Wells-Petry 1993, p. 5). 
A fundamental paradox is evident here. The U.S. 
military exists for the purpose of defending not only 
America's citizens and soil, but also American ideology. 
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Themes of freedom and justice are found throughout the 
U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The right to 
equal protection under the law for all citizens of the 
United States is guaranteed in the 14th Amendment of the 
Constitution. It states that "privileges or immunities" 
of U.S. citizens must be ensured. 
Yet the military the organization whose purpose is 
to protect and def end these doctrines -- violates the 
spirit (and frequently the letter) of the Constitution by 
systematically discriminating against categories of 
people. 
There are indications that the military does not need 
to institutionalize discrimination to curb inappropriate 
or hostile behaviors by some service members toward 
others. The power of the military organization to 
influence the behaviors of its members is reflected in 
this paradox: some members of the military are not 
prejudiced toward other people, yet are forced by law or 
regulation to discriminate; while other members who are 
prejudiced toward others are forced by the same legal 
apparatus (regulations banning sexual harassment, etc.) to 
refrain from discriminating. This paradox illustrates 
Merton's {1976, p. 192) typology of ethnic prejudice and 
discrimination: 
(S)o far as the beliefs of individuals are 
concerned, we can identify two types: those who 
genuinely believe in the creed (of prejudice] 
and those who do not .... Similarly, with 
respect to actual practices: conduct may or may 
not conform to the creed. And further, this 
being the salient consideration: conduct may or 
may not conform with individuals' own beliefs 
concerning the moral claims of all people to 
equal opportunity. 
stated in formal sociological terms, this 
asserts that attitudes and overt behavior vary 
independently. Prejudicial attitudes need not 
coincide with discriminatory behavior (emphasis 
in original). 
The fact that prejudice and discrimination can 
operate independently suggests two points: first, 
discriminatory behavior might be suppressed no matter how 
service members feel toward one another; and second, 
discrimination can become institutionalized if the 
prejudices held by a small number of people those in 
charge of making the laws and setting the policies -- are 
codified into rules that all service members must follow. 
Therefore, the following examination of institutionalized 
discrimination in the military at times includes the 
necessarily related issues of individual prejudice and 
discrimination. 
Questions, Definitions and Assumptions 
The historical pattern of discrimination within the 
military inspires the question: If bureaucracies are 
5 
meritocratic in character, why has the bureaucracy that is 
the U.S. military resisted the inclusion of perceived 
outgroups, whose characteristics have nothing to do with 
6 
the manifest function of the military? A related question 
may be posed: What is the base for challenges to these 
practices? 
Perhaps the perceived threat is not to bureaucratic 
functioning at all, but rather to the small working groups 
(units) in which service members interact on a much more 
personal level. The practical function of these small 
groups, which operate within the larger bureaucratic 
framework, may (or may not) depend upon a level of 
camaraderie among their members. People deemed 
undesirable to the majority of group members because of 
their categorical differences would pose an obvious threat 
to affective bonding within the group. The group would 
then be forced to rely upon the functional interdependence 
of its members-- the division of labor which requires all 
service members to perform their jobs proficiently in 
order for others in the group to do the same. Group 
cohesion based upon the functional interdependence of 
members could eliminate the necessity for affection among 
members, and instead require from them only a professional 
attitude toward one another and toward the military. 
Whether the military believes small unit cohesion is 
based upon camaraderie among service members, or upon 
their functional interdependence, could be the crucial 
factor in determining whether to risk policy changes that 
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are more inclusive toward outgroups. 
"The military" as used here is very broadly defined. 
It generally refers to those services currently under the 
aegis of the United States Department of Defense: the 
Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps. Also 
included are the reserve components of these services, the 
National Guard and the Air Guard, and the United States 
Coast Guard. Further included are service academies, the 
Pentagon, and any service organization under the War 
Department until World War II but since then consolidated, 
renamed or disbanded. 
The terms "category," "group" and "outgroup" are used 
throughout in reference to racial minorities, women and 
homosexuals. While there can be little dispute that 
"category" is an appropriate term for race, sex, and 
sexual orientation-- concepts which can be applied to 
people anywhere, the terms "group" and "outgroup" imply 
something different: smaller numbers of people, usually in 
the presence of one another, and who identify with one 
another, if the strict sociological definition is applied. 
Nonetheless, categorical distinctions such as race, sex 
and sexual orientation can and do cause divisions between 
people at the small-group level. Therefore all three 
terms -- category, group, and outgroup -- are considered 
appropriate terms for racial minorities, women, and 
homosexuals within the context of the following 
discussion. 
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Examined in this work are rationalizations supporting 
and opposing the inclusion of the above-named outgroups in 
the United States military. The following assumptions are 
made: 
1. The U.S. military fits the bureaucratic model of 
organization as well as -- and often better than 
other organizations stereotypically thought of as 
"bureaucracies." 
2. Institutionalized discrimination against categories 
of people exists in the military, contradicting the 
bureaucratic model of organization. 
3. The exclusion of outgroups from participation in the 
U.S. military will be justified or condemned with 
language that can be classified into the terms of 
small-group interaction-- the self-categorization of, 
or interdependence of service members. 
4. "Reformists," who argue for a more inclusive military 
organization, will rely on the bureaucratic model of 
individual merit, or the small-group concept of 
interdependence to support their stance, because 
race, sex, and sexual orientation are not relevant to 
small-unit cohesion based upon interdependence; while 
"exclusionists," who argue for maintaining the 
discriminatory status quo, will rely upon the self-
categorical hostility toward outgroups to support 
their stance, because such outgroups are felt to 
threaten small-unit cohesion based upon camaraderie. 
"Exclusionists" argue that the role of the military 
as the defender of the United States is too important to 
subject it to social experiments in equality (Wells-Petry 
1993, p. 170). "Reformists," who have pushed to make the 
military more inclusive argue that, besides being unfair, 
discrimination within the ranks does more damage to 
military readiness by putting unnecessary psychological 
strain on some service members than would occur by 
allowing equal opportunity for all people to serve (Davis 
1991, p. 103). 
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By examining the constructions of meanings of 
participation in the military for three categories of 
people -- racial minorities, women, and homosexuals --
limitations of the bureaucratic model will be explored in 
the following chapters. Ancillary concerns include such 
matters as the larger social contexts within which 
military service by these categories of people becomes 
less threatening to the military; historical changes in 
the meaning of their participation; and modes of 
accommodation that are utilized by both the military as an 
organization and by the affected members. 
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Individual service members, of course, may be members 
of more than one of these "outgroup" categories. Such 
overlapping membership may be seen as placing people into 
unique categories which face discrimination that is not 
merely the sum of its parts; that is, a black woman may be 
placed in a category that is not merely a reflection of 
racism and sexism, but rather a more specific set of 
stereotypes that are applicable only to black women. 
However, the possibility of overlapping outgroup 
membership is ignored here. This is because the military 
has not recognized such dual membership in the form of 
laws or regulations, and because the experiences of 
individual service members are viewed as less important 
than the treatment of the category as a whole. Therefore, 
the rationalizations for and against discrimination 
involving each outgroup are compared and contrasted as 
though group membership is exclusive. 
Overview of Methodology 
To examine the arguments for and against exclusionary 
policies in the military data were gathered from a daily 
newspaper -- the New York Times -- from periods 
surrounding each of three years: 1948, 1979, and 1993 (see 
the further discussion in Chapter III -- "Methodology"). 
It was during these years that legislative or regulatory 
changes profoundly affecting the military status of racial 
minorities, women, and homosexuals were debated or 
enacted. 
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There is an acknowledged weakness in using a 
newspaper as a source of data. News writing generally 
does not provide "scientific" examinations of issues. 
Nevertheless, it is considered important to use this 
source of data, because newspapers convey, and frequently 
help produce, cultural attitudes regarding issues. The 
media both shapes and reflects public perception. The New 
York Times was chosen because it is circulated nation-wide 
and therefore has the potential to reach people in all 
regions of the United States (see the further discussion 
in Chapter III -- "Methodology"). 
From discussions in the newspaper there emerge 
justifications for military policy as it stands as well as 
justifications for implementing changes in policy. These 
are first categorized by the policy position they support, 
that is, they are categorized as "exclusionist" if they 
support the exclusionary status quo, or "reformist" if 
they support more inclusive policy changes. The arguments 
are then further categorized by their rationale, that is, 
whether they invoke "interdependent" or "self-categorical" 
models of small-group cohesion as rationales for retaining 
or reforming military policy. 
Given that the presence of outgroup members in the 
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military is viewed as a threat to small-unit cohesion, it 
is reasonable to assume that the threat, once articulated, 
could easily be categorized into either self-categorical 
or interdependent models of cohesion. However, analysis 
of the data in Chapter IV reveals that this is rarely so. 
Despite the perceived threat to small-unit cohesion, both 
exclusionist and reformist arguments most frequently 
invoke rationales which have nothing whatsoever to do with 
small group cohesion. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
BACKGROUND 
Introduction 
The contemporary United States military displays many 
characteristics of bureaucracies. The strict hierarchical 
structures which have always existed in the military are 
complemented by a division of labor that is becoming 
increasingly more complex. Technological developments in 
weaponry, communications, transportation, and other things 
necessary to wage war have forced the military 
organization to rely on the professionalization of its 
members (Janowitz 1959, p. 15). 
Military service members are not unlike their 
civilian counterparts in other bureaucratic organizations. 
Therefore, an examination of the general characteristics 
of bureaucracies, and the ways in which they deal with 
their members, may illuminate some of the ways in which 
the military controls service members. 
Both the strengths and weaknesses of the bureaucratic 
form of organization may be observed in the military. One 
of the strengths of bureaucracy is reflected in the 
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military's organizational independence from individual 
service members. A critical weakness of bureaucracy is 
illustrated by human-relations and other problems within 
the military. 
BUREAUCRACY 
Characteristics of Bureaucracies 
Max Weber's model of bureaucracy depicts an 
organizational form depending upon hierarchy, clear 
definitions of positions and rules for interaction, 
explicit goals, and the interdependence of organizational 
divisions to ensure cohesion (Weber 1946, pp. 196-98). 
The geographic areas covered by bureaucracies may be so 
vast, and the numbers of members so large, that it is an 
impossibility for members to become familiar with one 
another. Weber asserts that this is not a disadvantage 
for the person holding a position, or "office" in the 
bureaucratic organization, because the member's loyalty is 
to the office itself, rather than to other organizational 
members. As Weber states: 
Entrance into an office ... is considered an 
acceptance of a specific obligation of faithful 
management in return for a secure existence. It 
is decisive for the specific nature of modern 
loyalty to an office that, in the pure type, it 
does not establish a relationship to a 
person .... Modern loyalty is devoted to 
impersonal and functional purposes (1946, p. 
199; italics in original). 
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Occupational responsibilities, then, are of paramount 
importance, while the personal characteristics of those 
who hold the jobs are of less importance. 
This "rational" form of organization rests upon the 
idea that a formalized structure of social arrangements 
makes the personal characteristics of members irrelevant 
to the manifest function of the organization (Scott 1992, 
p. 31). Strict regulation of behavior lends stability and 
predictability to relationships among members. 
Understanding how they fit into the structure of the 
organization allows members to anticipate the actions of 
all other members, based upon an understanding of roles 
within the organization. Hypothetically, the only 
relevant differences between members are the types of 
organizational training and experiences they have had and 
the levels of authority they can exercise. 
Formalization, then, allows an organization to 
replace one member with another of equal training, with 
minimal impact upon the function of the organization. The 
formalized social roles are independent of the members who 
fill them (Scott 1992, p. 33). Formal organizations are 
able to encourage cohesion among members through the 
interdependence of organizational units (Benveniste 1977, 
p. 6), and by enabling members to predict one another's 
behavior (Weber 1946, p. 214). 
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The prescribed requirements for positions within the 
rational organization are designed, inter alia, to prevent 
members from occupying positions for which they are not 
qualified. Once members are qualified, they may fill 
those particular positions in any part of the 
organization. Positions are standardized, and therefore 
determine the roles that members employ when interacting 
with one another. In effect, members become parts of an 
organizational "machine." Weber (1946, p. 228) describes 
their situation: 
[W]here the bureaucratization of administration 
has been completely carried through, a form of 
power relation is established that is 
practically unshatterable. 
The individual bureaucrat cannot squirm out of 
the apparatus in which he is harnessed .... 
[T]he professional bureaucrat is chained to his 
activity by his entire material and ideal 
existence. In the great majority of cases, he 
is only a single cog in an ever-moving mechanism 
which prescribes to him an essentially fixed 
route of march (gender in the original). 
Weber's description of formal organization implies 
that the characteristics or personalities of members make 
no difference to the functioning of formal organizations, 
as long as those members are able and willing to enact 
their roles. People are viewed as mechanized beings, with 
no concerns outside of the organization. 
Yet humans are not machines, and cannot be expected 
to exist without the influence of emotions. Further, no 
organization can exist without members. Therefore, the 
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characteristics, personalities, and concerns of members 
must affect organizations. 
Limits of the Bureaucratic Model 
Much effort has been given to the study of the 
reciprocal influences of bureaucratic organizations and 
their members (See, for example, Benveniste 1977; Blau 
1974; crozier 1964). Even the most standardized 
"predictable" organization must take into account the wild 
card of human behavior. Crozier's (1964) notion of the 
"human factor" suggests that organizational members' 
behaviors are influenced by their feelings-- sometimes 
despite the rules of the organization. If members are, in 
fact, motivated within the organization by feelings that 
are independent of organizational goals, their behaviors 
become more difficult to predict. In his conceptual-
ization of "bureaucratic dysfunction," Crozier (1964, p. 
179) describes this "human relations" approach to 
bureaucracy: 
When one believes that human activities depend 
on the feelings and sentiments of the people 
involved, and on the interpersonal and group 
relationships that influence them, one cannot 
expect that imposing economic rationality on 
them will bring constant and predictable 
results. The functioning of a bureaucracy can 
never ... be totally explained by the combination 
of impersonality, expertness, and hierarchy of 
the "ideal type." 
The preceding commentary reinforces the view that 
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interpersonal and group relationships cannot be separated 
from organizational function. 
It is the nature of bureaucracies to react against 
the unpredictable human factor by imposing more rules 
and/or tougher sanctions against misbehavior (Palola and 
Jones 1965, p. 3). If organizations are to function at 
peak efficiency, they must acknowledge the possibility 
that members will work in the best interest of the 
organization only if they can be coerced into so doing. 
Cozier (1964, p. 179) continues: 
The behavioral rigidity ... that exist[s] in a 
bureaucracy reinforce[s] the need for control and 
regulation. Thus, finally, the unintended and 
dysfunctional results of the bureaucratic model tend 
to reinforce their hold. In human relations terms, 
dysfunction appears to be the consequence of the 
resistance of the human factor to standardized 
behavior that is imposed upon it mechanically. 
Weber (1946) conceptualizes human emotion as an 
unpredictable liability which must be tightly controlled 
within organizations, or whenever possible, eliminated 
from them. Given that people are beings affected by 
emotion, and that people exist in all organizations, it is 
then important to examine how and why (or why not) people 
willingly work together within organizations. It is 
important because only by acknowledging that members' 
attitudes and characteristics affect bureaucracies can 
organizations begin to realize their greatest human 
resource potential. 
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THE U.S. MILITARY AS A BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION 
The United States Military, as an organization, 
exemplifies the bureaucratic model. Organizational 
definitions of jobs and responsibilities are so rigid and 
concise that the members who fill the roles are akin to 
interchangeable parts. Ostensibly, members' personal 
characteristics are irrelevant, so long as they perform 
their jobs and follow regulations. 
Nonetheless, the military does discriminate against 
certain categories of people, even if individuals within 
those categories would otherwise meet the criteria of the 
job. For example, felons, the young and the aged, and 
conscientious objectors have been excluded from military 
service. Further, within the services, members routinely 
face discrimination on the basis of their height and 
weight, physical strength, visual and auditory acuity, and 
intelligence (Wells-Petry 1993, p. 5). 
These criteria directly reflect the function of the 
military. Excluding or limiting service by people in 
these categories helps ensure that qualifications for jobs 
will be met. For example, to earn the label "felon," a 
person must have demonstrated an unwillingness or 
inability to function as a law-abiding member of society. 
Felons' supposed tendencies toward antisocial or erratic 
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behavior make their service in the contemporary military 
too unpredictable, and therefore, useless. Middle-aged 
people are more likely than younger recruits to have 
developed medical problems that would compromise their 
ability to fill military jobs, thus limiting their 
service. such people also generally have a bigger "stake" 
in life, because they have had more time to marry, settle 
into careers and acquire property, factors to which Becker 
(1960, p. 35) refers as "side bets." Further, society 
itself has a "stake" in middle-aged people, who are 
employed in needed professions, contributing the most 
money into the tax base, and exercising their purchasing 
power. People younger than 17 years are considered too 
immature, both psychologically and physically, to handle 
the responsibility of military service~ Conscientious 
objectors, by definition, have made statements that they 
will refuse to obey certain orders -- to carry a weapon, 
for example -- thus making their service incompatible with 
many of the military's needs. 
Within the services (as within other organizations), 
people with limited sight or hearing, or a lack of 
intelligence or strength are limited in the range of 
vocations available to them. 
These forms of "discrimination" are justified by the 
rational organization that is the U.S. military because 
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they are based upon peoples' presumed ability (or lack 
thereof) to adequately function in organizational roles. 
In the case of military service, the inability to function 
in organizational roles could come at a very high cost --
the lives of members -- or in a worst-case scenario, the 
way of life for an entire nation. Thus these exclusions 
can be seen as forms of defensible, or functional, 
discrimination. 
Yet historically, the U.S. military has chosen to 
discriminate against categories of people for reasons 
other than functional ones. The supposed impersonal 
nature of rational organizations is not manifest when the 
military resists the inclusion of people because of 
characteristics irrelevant to organizational function. 
Traits such as race, sex and sexual orientation are not 
specified as requirements for any particular military job, 
yet these traits have been used as criteria for excluding 
categories of people in part, or completely, from military 
service (see among others, Nalty 1986; Holm 1982; Shilts 
1993) . 
Many of the historical and current patterns of 
discrimination against racial minorities, women and 
homosexuals was, and is, based upon the perceived 
inability of people in these categories to perform 
organizational functions (Department of Defense 1985; 
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Steihm 1989), or their threat to organizational security 
{Wells-Petry 1993, p. 120). Yet many of the "inabilities" 
and "unsuitable" characteristics attributed to racial 
minorities, women, and homosexuals -- such as lack of 
intelligence, physical weakness, or moral depravity -- are 
shared by white male heterosexuals. Discrimination then 
must be justified in another way-- it becomes an effort to 
ensure social stability, even if the victims of the 
discrimination are perfectly capable of organizational 
performance. 
The Total Institution 
The U.S. military is a particularly restrictive form 
of bureaucracy-- a total institution. The total 
institution is described as an organization having 
characteristics which make it an all-encompassing 
influence in the lives of those who are its members. 
Erving Goffman outlined four traits which set total 
institutions apart from other organizations. First, 
members of the total institution eat, sleep and play in 
the same place, and under the same authority. Second, 
their activities are carried on in the presence of others, 
all of whom are treated alike, and are required to do the 
same things together. Third, the daily activities are 
tightly scheduled, with a sequence of activities being 
imposed by a system of explicit formal rulings and a body 
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of officials. Finally, these enforced activities are part 
of a single plan designed to achieve the goals of the 
institution {Goffman 1961, p. 6). 
Goffman further states that in total institutions, a 
split exists between a "large managed group" which he 
calls "inmates," and small supervisory staff. While the 
inmates live in the institution and have limited contact 
with anyone outside, the staff operate on an eight-hour 
day and are socially integrated into the outside world 
(1961, p. 7). 
The U.S. military as a total institution differs from 
Goffman's model in that the "inmates" and "staff" are more 
nearly in the same situation. Although strict hierarchies 
exist within and between the officer and enlisted ranks, 
the fact remains that all service members have signed 
contracts which limit their life options. Because the 
military is a form of indentured servitude, no service 
member -- officer or enlisted -- has the option of simply 
quitting the job. All members have enlistment contracts 
which require that they serve a prescribed amount of time. 
All members are "inmates" of the institution. 
The military diverges from Goffman's description in 
another important way: the amount of time a service member 
spends isolated from the outside world. Goffman's inmates 
are severely restricted in their interactions with 
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outsiders, but military service members have varying 
amounts of time in contact with the outside. For example, 
submarine crewmen may spend months in only each other's 
presence, without even seeing the light of day, while a 
military recruiter may live in civilian housing and 
commute to an eight-hour day job just as civilians do. 
Nonetheless, the military institution has the 
structural capacity to strictly regulate the lives of its 
members. Basic training is the most extreme example, 
wherein new recruits find that even their most minute 
behaviors are regulated: from their manner of speech and 
movement, to the particular ways they must dress and 
groom, to the times they may sleep or must wake. This 
type of indoctrination is designed to tear down recruits' 
individual identities, and force them to identify with the 
institution (Zurcher 1967). 
Finally, the military has power over the very lives 
of service members. Particularly in times of war, the 
military may send service members on missions that will 
obviously result in casualties. Service members must 
follow the orders given to them or face disciplinary 
action ranging from verbal reprimand to execution. 
This structural capacity for strict regulation of 
behavior, and the absolute power of life and death over 
its members makes conceptualizing the military as a 
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"total" institution a useful approach. It does not matter 
how much regulation of behavior is actually imposed upon 
individual service members, or whether or not their lives 
are endangered. All service members must live with the 
reality that their lives may be disrupted at any time, 
that they may be forced by war or by other circumstances 
to move from "home" or be separated from family, forced to 
live in unfamiliar surroundings and required to work 
efficiently with unknown people. The only thing that 
matters to the institution is that its members can be made 
-- by force if necessary -- to perform their military 
function. 
Uniform Code of Military Justice 
Organizations have different levels of authority, 
and, therefore, may exercise different levels of coercion 
to control their members. The level of coercion that any 
formal organization may use to deal with its members is 
prescribed by state and federal laws. Organizations such 
as businesses and schools may use expulsion as their 
ultimate sanction. Other organizations, such as prisons 
or mental hospitals, may deprive members of their 
belongings or impose varying degrees of restriction of 
members' freedom of movement. While organizations may use 
their limited sanctions to deal with breaches of internal 
rules, in general only the federal or state governments 
may prosecute people for criminal offenses. The sole 
exception to this rule is the U.S. military. The U.S. 
military organization has the legal authority to try its 
members for criminal offenses. 
The U.S. military is differentiated from other 
organizations by its legal system, based upon the Manual 
of Courts Martial (MCM), which contains the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice {UCMJ). This body of law separates 
service members from many of the rights guaranteed 
civilians by the United States Constitution. The rights 
to a trial by jury, and to post bail are forfeited. 
Written depositions may be introduced in non-capital 
cases, in contradiction of the defendant's right to 
confront witnesses. In fact, the Supreme Court has 
... never to this day squarely held that a 
soldier has any constitutional rights when he is 
court-martialed, or indeed that he has any 
constitutional rights of any variety (Bishop 
1974, p. 114; gender in the original). 
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The U.S. military even has the power, when allowed by 
Congress, to conscript people into the organization 
against their will. Male civilians may be deprived of 
their Constitutional rights guaranteed under the 13th 
Amendment and forced into a form of indentured servitude--
the military enlistment contract. Once forced into the 
organization, they are then compelled to conform to 
organizational rules under threat of punishment. 
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One argument suggests that the justice system in the 
military is not designed to provide justice at all, but 
rather to enforce discipline (Sherrill 1969, p. 67). The 
result is an uneven application of military law, whereby 
some innocent service members will be severely punished in 
order to set an example for others, and some guilty 
service members will not be prosecuted, if their trial 
could prove embarrassing to their command (West 1977, p. 
ix). 
Service members are viewed as the property of their 
commanding officers (Sherrill 1969, p. 1). If a service 
member is accused of misconduct, the structure of the 
military court-martial allows great potential for 
miscarriage of justice. West (1977, p. ix) describes the 
initial process of forming the court-martial: 
[The commanding officer] may refer the charges 
to trial by a court-martial convened by himself, 
or he may ref er the charges to a higher 
commander with a recommendation for trial by 
that commander. In either event the officer who 
refers the case to trial by court-martial would 
appoint counsel for both sides as well as the 
court members (i.e., the jury) from the 
membership of his own command (gender in the 
original) . 
The UCMJ forbids unlawfully influencing the action of 
court {837 Art. 37). Yet the fact that a commanding 
officer has the authority to select court members from his 
own command leaves ample room for misuse of authority. 
Officers who are familiar with one another are able to 
fathom what is expected or desired by officers higher up 
in the chain of command. Service members on trial can 
only hope that court members are motivated to achieve 
justice rather than to "save face" for the command or to 
protect their own careers. 
SUMMARY OF BACKGROUND 
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The preceding discussion illustrates the bureaucratic 
model of organization and how the U.S. military fits this 
model. Further, it is argued that the military is a total 
institution-- an organization which has control over 
virtually all spheres of its members' lives. Finally, it 
is asserted that the military has unparalleled power --
when compared to other total institutions -- to control 
the behaviors of its members, because it has the power to 
prosecute its members for criminal offenses. 
Understanding the military's structural capability to 
control the behavior of its members makes the threats 
posed by their possible misbehavior appear less perilous. 
Yet the military continues to argue that internal threats 
are posed by the presence of certain categories of people. 
The following sections illustrate how the personalities of 
individual members, and attitudes of small groups or units 
may affect the organizational functioning of the military 
and other bureaucracies. This in turn may partially 
explain the military's exclusionary practices. 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Introduction 
The bureaucratic model of organization stresses 
interdependence as one mechanism for ensuring functional 
cohesion between organizational units. Yet it is also 
clear that the personalities of those who work in 
bureaucracies may greatly affect the function of these 
organizations. Attention is focused here on micro-level 
issues of why people within organizational units choose 
(or refuse) to work together in a cohesive manner. 
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Sources of cohesion within and between groups of 
people may generally be described as fitting either one of 
two models: self-categorization, wherein people are 
described as identifying with one another because of 
"likeness" or shared experiences; or interdependence, 
wherein people are described as not necessarily feeling 
affection for each other, but needing each other to 
fulfill mutual goals (Turner 1987, pp. 19-26). 
Self-categorization 
A social group is conceptualized in self-
categorization theory as a ''collection of individuals who 
perceive themselves to be members of the same social 
category ... and apply the ingroup's norms of conduct to 
themselves" (Turner 1987, p. 101). This model suggests 
that there is an "attraction" between ingroup members 
which indicates intragroup cohesion. 
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The most-studied factor related to attraction has 
been similarity of group members, especially in terms of 
demographic factors such as socioeconomic status, 
education, occupation, age, race and gender (McGrath 1984, 
p. 187). This element of self-categorization theory 
suggests that merely being in the same race, sex, or other 
demographic category, and identifying with that category, 
is enough to generate ingroup cohesion. 
This process of categorizing people produces and 
reflects stereotypes about members of groups. Groups are 
seen as desirable (ingroups), or undesirable (outgroups), 
based on the similarity (or dissimilarity) a person feels 
with a given group. The desire to obtain or retain 
ingroup membership encourages people to conform to ingroup 
norms and values. As Turner states, "[S]elf-
categorization leads to stereotypical self-perception 
and ... adherence to and expression of ingroup normative 
behavior" (1987, p. 102). A model of this type of 
cohesion (also called the primary group bond) is that 
found in family and friendship relationships. 
The need to gain and retain the approval of the 
primary group is described by Sherif (1964) in a study of 
group formation among boys in a summer camp: 
(H)ierarchical ordering ... is not the only 
dimension of group organization. Mutual liking 
also forms a pattern .... 
Thus, it can and does happen that individuals 
comply or conform in attitude and behavior to 
the organizational and normative system of their 
groups out of requirements of an inner voice 
(conscience), sense of loyalty, sense of 
responsibility, even sense of decency relative 
to follow [sic] members .... After all, fellow 
members are important persons in the 
individual's scheme of things, proportional to 
the importance of the group in providing support 
for his personal identity and as an 
instrumentality for fulfillment of his needs 
(pp. 264 and 271; gender in the original). 
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The power of self-categorical groups to compel conformity, 
then, is not only a reflection of a member's need to 
belong, but also a reflection of a member's need to define 
the self through group membership. 
Interdependence 
Self-categorization theory can be contrasted with 
interdependence theory, particularly that part which 
stresses functional unity. "Functional unity" refers to 
the satisfaction of group members' mutual needs, or mutual 
goals (Turner 1988, p. 20). This theory suggests that 
members need not like each other in order to function as a 
cohesive group, as long as they depend upon each other. 
This type of cohesion can be amplified in stressful 
situations. For example, when goal attainment is 
immediately important, group members become more cohesive 
(pull together) in order to achieve the goal (Johnson 
1992, p. 203). 
Further, Shaw (1976) hypothesizes that " ... group 
cohesion increases the degree of social interaction, co-
operation and influence between members" indicating that 
the degree of functional unity that exists between or 
among ingroup members may increase cohesion as members 
share more group experiences or perceive a common fate. 
According to Janowitz {1959), cohesion based upon 
functional unity is the type of cohesion that is 
manifested by military service members. He states: 
[I]t is not necessary to assume that cohesion 
in primary groups can only be the result of 
uniformity or like-mindedness among its members. 
To the contrary, a division of labor and a 
blending of perspectives can be the basis of 
group cohesion. What is crucial from the point 
of view of the military establishment is that 
the members of the smallest tactical units have 
gone through some trying group experiences which 
demonstrate to them the value of social 
solidarity (p. 66}. 
Bureaucratic organizations like the military, in this 
view, may find that cohesion among their members, 
especially at the small-unit level, is most easily 
generated through interdependence and the experience of 
working together successfully. 
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This interdependence-based cohesion is illustrated in 
Peter Bourne's (1970} study of members of an Army Special 
Forces unit in Vietnam: 
Except at times of actual attack, when group 
cooperation is imperative, open conflict among 
group members is commonplace .... 
Among the twelve team members a precarious and 
often changing balance of relationships exists. 
On the one hand, the shared danger of the 
external threat pushes them toward accepting 
cooperative membership in the group; at the same 
time, the all-important need of these men to 
confirm their self-reliance and independence ... 
acts to force the group apart (pp. 114-115). 
Bourne's study indicates that in fact, members of small-
units need not identify with one another at all. They 
need only to recognize that their jobs, if not their 
lives, depend upon other members of the group performing 
their group functions. 
Self-categorization and interdependence theory are 
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utilized in the following analysis to address some of the 
reasons that the military chooses to discriminate against 
groups of service members despite its bureaucratic 
organizational form and its unequalled power to control 
its members' behavior. 
It is noted here that the self-categorization and 
interdependence models of group cohesion are similar to 
Emile Durkheim's mechanical and organic models of 
solidarity. Durkheim's concepts, however, are more 
generally applicable to community or cultural solidarity 
than to group behavior. Therefore the analysis is limited 
to the small-group models of cohesion. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
To those who must abide by them, regulations and laws 
governing the military are generally left unexplained. 
The opinions of service members regarding military policy 
are largely irrelevant; the willingness of service members 
to carry out their orders is all that matters. It is 
difficult, therefore, to infer from military regulations 
the specific reasons for discriminatory policies. In 
different historical periods, racial minorities, women, 
and homosexuals have all been perceived as threats to such 
things as "cohesion," "good order," "discipline," and 
"morale" (Binkin and Eitelberg 1982, p. 98; Goldman 1982, 
p. 252; Wells-Petry 1993, p. 91). The specific meaning 
that these concepts have, as they relate to military 
service, is not specified in the laws and regulations that 
affect these outgroups, nor is there any comprehensive 
explanation for why outgroups are viewed as disrupting 
forces in these areas. 
It is a more simple task to go outside the military 
to ascertain exactly how the inclusion of outgroups could 
be construed as a threat to cohesion, good order, 
discipline, or morale. This may be accomplished in two 
ways: by examining the historical context giving rise to 
military policy and the proposed changes in it, and by 
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examining stated reasons for the policies and the proposed 
changes in them. 
In the following chapter the changes affecting each 
of three outgroups are put in historical and political 
contexts. Such background information provides greater 
understanding of each group's status in society and the 
evolution of their statuses in military service before the 
changes in laws or regulations that affect them occurred. 
The importance of social context is described by c. Wright 
Mills (1959, pp. 5-6): 
The sociological imagination enables its 
possessor to understand the larger historical 
scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life 
and the external career of a variety of 
individuals .... 
The first fruit of this imagination -- and the 
first lesson of the social science that embodies 
it -- is the idea that the individual can 
understand his own experience and gauge his own 
fate only by locating himself within his period, 
that he can know his own chances in life only by 
becoming aware of those of all individuals in 
his circumstances .... 
The sociological imagination enables us to 
grasp history and biography and the relations 
between the two within society. That is its 
task and its promise (gender in original). 
It is assumed that differing societal perceptions of 
the characteristics of these groups leads to different 
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rationalizations for discriminating against them. Such 
perceptions might be illustrated by the different kinds of 
limitations placed on the military service of the three 
groups. 
As mentioned above, the rationale for laws and 
regulations governing the military are generally left 
unexplained. Therefore, evidence that illustrates the 
arguments for or against the inclusion of outgroups in 
military service must be gathered elsewhere. The printed 
news medium is used in an attempt to expose the rationale 
behind military policy. Because it has fewer constraints 
than military policy-makers, the print news medium is free 
to publish more objective and in-depth analyses of the 
issue of discrimination in the military. 
GENERAL METHODS 
For the purpose of illustrating arguments for and 
against discriminatory policies, commentary from the New 
York Times was selected from the years during which laws 
and regulatory changes affecting each of the three groups 
were debated or enacted. This was accomplished by using 
the New York Times Index to find relevant articles and 
commentary concerning each group. The number of 
references selected for each case was limited by time--
no more than a two-year window in which to choose articles 
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for each group; or by number-- a maximum of 50 articles 
for each group (see the following sections for greater 
detail). These parameters were intended to place a limit 
on a virtually endless supply of data, and also to gather 
the "freshest" data-- those articles that were written 
during the heat of the debates. 
Racial Minorities 
President Harry s. Truman issued his Executive Order 
abolishing racial segregation in the military on July 26, 
1948. The New York Times Index was searched for articles 
pertaining to racial issues in the military for the year 
preceding the Executive Order, and the year following it, 
creating a two-year window from July 26, 1947, to July 26, 
1949. Within these dates, the Index was searched under 
the section of "US - Military Forces - General," for 
articles pertaining to racial issues. Within this section 
of the Index, the year 1949 contained the sub-heading 
Racial Equality Program, which was also searched, even 
though it did not appear in the previous year of the 
Index. 
Rather than using a sample, all entries in the Index 
that mentioned racial issues in the military within the 
relevant time frame were included. This search yielded 31 
articles, editorials, or letters which either focused on 
the issue of racial desegregation of the military, or 
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mentioned it in discussions of other issues. 
Women 
The status of women in the U.S. military -- unlike 
that of blacks -- has undergone slow, incremental change 
over time. There is no single legislative or regulatory 
change that has had an affect similar to President 
Truman's Executive Order for racial desegregation. 
Therefore, for the purpose of gathering data, the New York 
Times Index was searched for appropriate entries 
surrounding March 22, 1979, the deadline originally set 
for ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment {ERA). 
Although the ERA was not specifically designed to change 
women's status within the military, it generated 
considerable debate over its possible effect on the 
services. Of particular concern was the possibility of 
women being subject to the draft, or of their being 
assigned combat roles. 
The Equal Rights Amendment was sent by Congress to 
the states for ratification on March 22, 1972. At that 
time it had overwhelming popular support (Boles 1979), and 
seemed sure to be adopted well before the deadline of 
March 22, 1979. Yet in 1978, only 35 of the necessary 38 
states had ratified the ERA, and four states had voted to 
rescind their earlier approval. 
The opponents of the Equal Rights Amendment had 
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proposed some politically damaging interpretations of the 
amendment. They asserted, among other things, that the 
ERA would force women to provide 50 percent of household 
income, wipe out sex segregation in reform schools, 
prisons and public rest rooms, and subject women to 
military conscription and to combat assignment. 
Further, the eleventh-hour political efforts to 
ratify the ERA coincided with a national debate over 
whether or not draft registration should be reinstated, 
thus forcing an examination of women's changing role in 
the military. Finally, this date also coincided with a 
perceived foreign military threat-- the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan. 
The New York Times Index was searched under the 
section "United States Armament and Defense," subsection 
Women for entries concerning the possible conscription of 
women, or their assignment to combat duty. 
Articles listed in these sections of the Index also 
pertained to such matters as the pregnancy of female 
service members, the dependency status of husbands, 
promotions, and unequal enlistment requirements for female 
in comparison to male service members. These issues were 
ignored, because they did not generate the type of 
emotional debate that surrounded the issues of draft 
status and combat assignments for women. In fact, the 
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possibility that women would be subject to the draft and 
combat assignment is considered a major factor in the 
defeat of the ERA (Mansbridge 1990). Therefore, 
commentary were selected only if the Index made reference 
to combat assignments or the draft. 
The search began with the original deadline date for 
the ratification of the ERA March 22, 1979 and 
worked forward and backward one day at a time until 50 
appropriate entries were found. This method of searching 
produced a window from April 6, 1978 to March 7, 1980--
350 days before and 350 days after the original March 22, 
1979 ERA ratification deadline. All of the Index 
references under the subsection Women that included 
discussion of the draft or combat assignments were 
included in the analysis. These included news articles, 
editorials, letters to the editor, and New York Times 
Magazine stories. 
Homosexuals 
On July 16, 1993, the Pentagon, the Justice 
Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and President 
Clinton finalized a compromise plan to allow homosexuals 
to serve in the U.S. military. The New York Times Index 
was searched for all mention of homosexuals, lesbians, or 
gays under the section "United States Armament and 
Defense" beginning on the date of the compromise, and 
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searching forward and backward one day at a time until a 
total of 50 such references were found. This method of 
searching generated a window from May 28, 1993, to 
September 3, 1993-- 49 days before and 49 days after the 
July 16, 1993 announcement of the compromise plan. 
Again, rather than using a sample, all of the Index 
references to homosexuals in the military within the above 
time frame were used in the analysis. This included news 
articles, editorials, letters to the editor, photograph 
captions, New York Times Magazine stories, and one 
correction to previous commentary. 
CODING THE DATA 
overview 
An original assumption was that rationales supporting 
or opposing exclusionary military policies would revolve 
around small-group models of cohesion. This means that 
reasons given for the exclusion or acceptance of outgroups 
in military service would fit either the "interdependence" 
or "self-categorical" models of group cohesion, as 
discussed in Chapter II. Yet the analysis of the data 
yielded a third, perhaps more important type of 
rationalization: the ideological argument. 
The ideological argument flies in the face of both 
the bureaucratic model, which stresses meritocracy, 
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impersonality, and the interdependence of organizational 
units, and small-group theories of interdependence and 
self-categorization. Ideological arguments stress 
abstract concepts of what "should be" rather than the more 
practical matters of human relations within a specific 
organization or group. A bureaucracy can determine, 
through standardized methods, who is best qualified to 
hold a particular position within the organization. Human 
interaction, whether viewed through the interdependence or 
self-categorization model of behavior, may also be 
directly observed. Yet ideology, though far more 
abstract, proves to be a powerful rationale both in favor 
of, and in opposition to changes in U.S. military policy. 
Ideological statements emerged from the data, and were, in 
fact, a very large part of the reformist stance. These 
statements, therefore, are included in addition to those 
fitting "interdependent" or "self-categorical" rationales 
for maintaining or reforming military policy. 
This technique for developing categories for the data 
gathered in content analyses is described in Bruce L. 
Berg's (1989) summation of grounded theory: 
The various categories researchers use in a 
content analysis can be determined inductively, 
deductively, or by some combination of both .... 
{A)n inductive approach begins with the 
researchers "immersing" themselves in the 
documents (that is, the various messages) in 
order to identify the dimensions or themes that 
seem meaningful to the producers of each 
message. In a deductive approach, researchers 
use some categorical scheme suggested by a 
theoretical perspective, and the documents 
provide a means for assessing the hypothesis. 
In many circumstances, the relationship between 
a theoretical perspective and certain messages 
involves both inductive and deductive 
approaches .... 
The development of inductive categories allows 
researchers to link, or ground these categories 
to the data from which they derive (pp. 111-112, 
emphasis in original) . 
In this thesis, the deductive approach was used to 
draw the self-categorical and interdependent categories 
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from the models of small-group cohesion. The ideological 
category was drawn inductively from the data gathered in 
the content analysis. 
Besides the ideological argument, the data also 
yielded a number of statements which reflected Weber's 
(1946) bureaucratic model of organization. These made 
reference to individual merit or qualification for a job 
as criteria for assigning military personnel. These 
statements were included in another inductively formed 
category-- the bureaucratic rationale. 
These four rationales for exclusion or reform --
ideological, interdependence, self-categorical, and 
bureaucratic were used as a framework for coding 
statements culled from the New York Times articles 
analyzed. They were cross-tabulated by the "reformist" or 
"exclusionist" stances implicit in the statements. The 
following table illustrates how the data were organized. 
44 
TABLE X EXEMPLAR 
STANCE TOWARD DISCRIMINATORY MILITARY POLICY BY RATIONALE 
STANCE 
RATIONALE I Exclusionist I Reformist II Total I 
Ideological 
Interdependence 
Self-Categorical 
Bureaucratic 
I Total II I II I 
These rationales for and against discriminatory 
policies in the U.S. military are first analyzed 
independently for each of the three groups: racial 
minorities, women and homosexuals. Then the distribution 
of statements are compared, contrasted and summarized in 
Chapter IV to illustrate the perceived similarities and 
differences between the three groups. 
Codes 
A content analysis of the Index references is done 
using individual statements, or parts of statements, as 
the unit of analysis. The themes of the articles 
themselves are ignored. This is because articles may 
include many statements, each of which may fit into a 
different category. In other words, a single article may 
contain several statements with stances both reformist and 
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exclusionist, and rationales that are ideological, 
interdependent, and/or self-categorical in character. 
Therefore, the units of analysis are the individual 
statements within an article rather than the article as a 
whole. Note that because articles are not limited in the 
number of statements that may be used as data, tables in 
the analysis sections contain a much larger number of 
relevant statements than the total number of articles from 
which they came. 
The following paragraphs describe the types of themes 
that would place statements into specific sub-categories. 
A reformist statement categorized as "ideological" in 
character would include references to justice, equality, 
civil rights, freedom, democracy, patriotism, religious 
principles (when the context supports reform), fairness, 
equal protection, and human dignity. Not included are the 
names of commissions or organizations that incorporate 
"ideological" language in their names. For example, the 
statement "this practice is contrary to the democratic way 
of life" is counted as an ideological statement, but the 
"President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and 
Opportunity in the Armed Services" is not. 
Exclusionist statements categorized as "ideological" 
include references to white supremacy (in a political 
context), Communism, states' rights, traditional morality 
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and religious ideals (when the context supports exclusion) 
and military tradition. 
For both the reformist and exclusionist stances, 
"interdependent" statements would include references to 
unit efficiency or interdependence of jobs, or statements 
implying that one service member's welfare is contingent 
upon the competence of other service members. 
Statements with "self-categorical" themes found in 
reformist articles include references to the shared 
experiences of service members working together, the 
precedence of experiments in military desegregation 
(another type of shared experience) and other similar 
experiments, "progressive demonstration," education, and 
military indoctrination of all personnel, which is an 
attempt to instill identity based on military membership. 
Statements with "self-categorical" themes found in 
exclusionist articles include references to group 
stereotypes, group loyalty, "friction" among service 
members {presumably based upon perceived differences), 
race and gender stereotyping and societal endorsement of 
racism and sexism. 
It could be argued that some self-categorical 
stereotypes regarding the roles that people "should" 
assume {based on their categorical membership) are 
essentially statements of morality. However, morality-
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based themes have been coded as ideological rationales. 
The difference lies in the numbers of people addressed by 
the statement: that is, ideological rationales are 
statements that apply to all people, whereas self-
categorical rationales, even when they appear to be based 
on "morality," are directed at one category of people. 
Finally, for both the reformist and exclusionist 
stances, "bureaucratic" statements include references to 
individual merit, individual job qualification or fitness 
for duty, and military organizational goals and functions. 
Throughout the analysis sections in Chapter IV are 
direct quotes of relevant statements culled from the New 
York Times articles, which are underlined and used as 
illustrations of the rationales and stances discussed 
above. Rather than using the cumbersome parenthetical 
reference style to note the sources, a bracketed letter 
and number represent each article as listed in Appendix A. 
For example, the statement, women don't belong on the 
battlefield came from article (W16]: "Prospect of the 
Draft Gets a Mixed Reaction From Feminists," published 
January 25, 1980, as listed under the "Women" section of 
the New York Times articles listed Appendix A. The same 
abbreviated reference style is used for racial minorities 
(Rnn] and homosexuals (Hnn]. 
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Inter-Rater Reliability 
In order to assess the reliability of the coding 
instrument used, a Portland State University sociology 
graduate student familiar with research methodology was 
given a sample of the commentary analyzed, along with the 
coding rules and a code sheet. The sample included 20 
articles selected from the New York Times Index. Analyzed 
for content, these articles yielded 82 statements which 
either supported or opposed discriminatory policies in the 
U.S. military, providing 82 possible matching points. The 
results indicate that of the 82 possible matching points, 
76 were similarly classified. This provided an inter-
rater reliability of .9268 or 93 percent, which was deemed 
adequate. 
The following chapter is broken into three major 
subsections, with one each focusing on racial minorities, 
women and homosexuals. An extensive analysis of these 
groups is attempted, including historical, empirical, and 
political contexts of their experience with the United 
States military. 
CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
RACIAL MINORITIES 
Introduction 
Throughout its history, the United States military 
has been marked by varying degrees of racial segregation 
and discrimination. Of immediate concern, however, is the 
situation of racial minorities in the U.S. military 
through the end of World War II, when their official 
status in the services was radically changed. On July 26, 
1948, President Harry S. Truman signed Executive Order 
9981, which decreed that the U.S. military would institute 
a new policy ensuring " ... equality of treatment and 
opportunity for all persons in the Armed Services without 
regard to race, color, religion or national origin." The 
order had a profound affect upon the status of racial 
minorities in the United States, within the military, and 
more generally within the civilian population. Minority 
leaders viewed desegregation of the services as a step 
toward " ... full participation in the benefits and 
responsibilities of American citizenship" (MacGregor 1981, 
p. 13) . 
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The term "racial minority," as used to describe U.S. 
military personnel, can be interpreted to mean any person 
who is not white/Caucasian. Until the Second World War 
segregation of minority races from whites, as much as 
possible, was the official military policy (DOD 1985). At 
different periods in U.S. military history, there have 
existed segregated units of African American, Japanese 
(Shibutani 1978), Native American (White 1990), Filipino 
(MacGregor 1982, p. 206), and Hispanic (DOD 1982) service 
members, to name a few. 
However, literature on the subject of racial 
minorities in the U.S. military is largely limited to 
studies of the status and experiences of blacks. This 
seems logical for three reasons. First, blacks are 
currently the largest racial minority in the United 
States, so any study of racial minorities in the U.S. is 
likely to focus upon them. Second, within the military, 
the total number of other racial minorities combined is 
less than half the number of blacks (Binkin and Eitelberg 
1982, p. 162). Third, the representation of other racial 
minorities in the military is more closely proportional to 
their numbers in the general population. Blacks 
constitute about 20 percent of the U.S. military (Young 
1982, p. 227), a much larger representation than their 12 
percent of the general population. 
The terms "minority" and "racial minority" as used 
here, are intended to include all people of color. The 
data, however, refer only to the situation of blacks in 
the military. Therefore the focus here is also upon the 
experiences of black service members. 
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Another caveat is pertinent at this point. Terms 
such as "colored" and "negro" appear in reference to 
blacks. These terms are not intended to cause offense or 
to indicate a lack of sensibility; rather they are cited 
as part of the historical context within which these terms 
were considered to be appropriate. 
The following section, except where otherwise noted, 
it is a synopsis of blacks' history in the United States 
military as presented by the Department of Defense (1985). 
Historical Perspective 
Racial minorities have always been involved in the 
United States military. Blacks were allowed to 
participate, to varying degrees, in military service in 
the U.S. even before the American Revolution (Binkin and 
Eitelberg 1982, DOD 1985). Since then they have 
experienced various degrees of inclusion in the military, 
ranging from the participation of selected individuals, to 
limited group participation, to complete inclusion in the 
contemporary U.S. military. 
The first use of blacks in military service in the 
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U.S. was compelled by fear of "Indian" uprisings. During 
America's colonial period, native people were perceived as 
a threat to white settlers, so colonists felt compelled to 
organize militias for self-defense. The first legislation 
enacting a military organization was passed in 1607. The 
earliest laws made no reference to race as a criterion for 
membership or nonmembership in any militia. In the 
Northern colonies, free blacks were allowed to serve. But 
by 1639, Virginia had passed a law excluding "negroes" 
from being provided with weapons. The use of blacks and 
"Indians" in the militia by other colonies was infrequent 
and on an individual basis. There was fear that arming 
blacks and training them to fight would increase the 
likelihood of slave revolts. As a result, blacks (usually 
only free blacks) were enlisted in large numbers in the 
colonial militias only when there was fear of imminent 
Indian uprisings. They functioned as laborers, scouts, 
and wagoners, but only rarely as combatants. Leadership 
roles were never open to blacks. 
The exclusion of blacks from colonial militias had 
another, unintended effect. It gave blacks the same 
elevated social status as others who were exempt from 
service, including ministers and public officials. 
Colonial legislatures responded by requiring free blacks 
to work on public projects for as many days as whites 
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contributed to military service. 
In 1775, approximately 20 percent of the colonial 
population was black. Despite the colonists' desperate 
need for manpower for the Revolutionary War effort, black 
service in the military was still limited by whites' fears 
of slave uprisings. The British played on the divisive 
issue of slavery by offering freedom to "all indentured 
servants, Negroes, or others" (read: rebels) who would 
fight for the British side. 
At first, the Continental Army did not allow the 
service of blacks, ordering recruiters not to enlist any 
"stroller, Negro, or vagabond." Yet despite the policy, 
blacks did serve. Early in the war, slaves sometimes took 
the place of their masters in military service (Binkin and 
Eitelberg 1982, p. 13). Eventually, a manpower shortage 
forced a change of policy. By 1778, Washington's army 
included 42 blacks serving with white soldiers on an 
integrated basis. By the end of the war, approximately 
5,000 blacks had served in the Colonial Army of 300,000. 
In contrast to the Army, the Continental Navy, which 
from its very inception struggled with manpower shortages, 
placed no limits on the numbers of blacks who could 
enlist. A 1775 recruiting poster encouraged "able backed 
sailors, men white or black, to vol·G1 ·teer for naval 
service." No law barred blacks from naval service, and in 
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fact, some blacks were paid bonuses for joining. 
In 1792, after the Revolutionary War, Congress passed 
an act limiting militia service to "free able-bodied white 
male citizens." It would become a pattern to allow the 
service of blacks and other minorities only when manpower 
shortages made it necessary. 
The Civil War gave blacks another chance to prove 
themselves in military service, but not at the beginning 
of the conflict. It was believed by many, including the 
President, that the purpose of the war was to preserve the 
Union rather than free the slaves (Frazier 1957, p. 107). 
President Lincoln, fearful that black Union soldiers might 
cause border states to join the Confederacy, barred the 
enlistment of black soldiers (Binkin and Eitelberg 1982, 
p. 13). But sagging enlistments again caused a change of 
policy in August of 1862. All-black regiments, with white 
officers, were formed. By May of 1863, the War Department 
was forced to create the Bureau of Colored Troops to 
handle the organization of black regiments for Federal 
service. From 1864 through the end of the war, blacks 
constituted 10 percent of the total Union Army force. 
These "colored troops" were frequ·~-.;·t:ly given the worst 
equipment and medical care, but they continued to serve 
with distinction. 
The Union Navy, with its chronic shortage of 
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manpower, began a more serious effort to enlist black 
sailors in 1861. There were no officially segregated 
units in the Union's navy, but blacks were relegated to 
lowly positions as servants, cooks, and powder boys. 
Blacks were never allowed to achieve officer or petty 
officer ranks, and were sometimes denied jobs such as 
"lookout," because it was believed that they lacked the 
necessary intelligence. But one black sailor, due to his 
courageous sea service, was appointed as an officer in the 
South Carolina militia after the war. 
Blacks continued to serve during Reconstruction in 
troops maintaining political stability in the Southern 
states. Their presence so outraged white Southerners that 
the government eventually had to disband some black units, 
and move the rest to posts on the western frontier. 
Negative attitudes toward blacks remained despite the 
victory that freed them from slavery. 
The years 1866 through 1890 saw westward expansion by 
mostly white settlers, despite the resistance of many of 
the native peoples. Black soldiers displayed such courage 
in campaigns against hostile Indian tribes that they 
earned the nickname "Buffalo Soldiers." Even though the 
Buffalo Soldiers protected mail shipments, railroad 
construction, and settlers, white townspeople generally 
refused them any kind of service or respect. 
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The brief Spanish-American War saw several volunteer 
black regiments with their own black officers. Military 
leaders were concerned, because blacks were still 
considered unfit for command. The issue became 
irrelevant, as the black-led troops arrived too late to 
see combat. But four regular-army black regiments, led by 
white officers, did see combat duty. White citizens did 
not know how to react to these returning black veterans. 
Some were celebrated as war heroes, while others were 
lynched by whites offended by their presence and status in 
the military. 
World War I gave blacks little opportunity to prove 
their mettle in combat. Once again, questions about the 
abilities of black combatants were raised. The General 
Staff believed that the "poorer class of backwoods negro 
has not the mental stamina and moral sturdiness to put him 
in the line." Further, the military had no policy for the 
utilization of black units in the war, and the integration 
of units was never considered. The majority of black 
draftees were again relegated to jobs such as laborer and 
stevedore. 
Blacks' chance to prove their ability to fight 
finally came in 1917, when the first black combat troops 
arrived in France. They were assigned to work under 
French command, and given French weapons and other 
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equipment. They served with such distinction that members 
of the black regiment were awarded the Croix de Guerre, or 
Legion of Honor, by France for their courage in action. 
In the years following World War I some in the War 
Department believed that blacks should not be allowed to 
serve in the military in peacetime. Reports by white 
officers alleged poor performance by black troops in 
combat. Charges of black cowardice were routine. War 
Department investigations pointed out poor leadership 
abilities of black officers. It was believed that black 
troops could function in combat, but only if led and 
motivated by white officers. When conscription began 
again in 1940, the military maintained a lower induction 
rate for blacks than for whites. 
During World War II, nearly three-quarters of the 
blacks who served in the military were in the Army, 
typically as combat support personnel. Only 2.8 percent 
of combat units were black. Generalizations about the 
poor combat abilities of black soldiers were still 
widespread. While the Civil Rights movement put pressure 
on the Army to end segregation, Army leaders argued that 
the service was not a laboratory for social 
experimentation. Yet, a kind of desegregation did occur 
during World War II. A German offensive in 1944 forced 
the Army to organize 2,500 black soldiers into separate 
platoons within white companies of the First and Seventh 
Armies. These were the only "integrated" Army units in 
World War II. 
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Until 1942, blacks who were permitted to enlist in 
the Navy were restricted to the messman's branch. They 
were prohibited from going to sea, and were instead 
assigned to small boat stations, or stations ashore. As a 
result, very few blacks in the Navy ever saw combat duty. 
In 1943, two Navy vessels were assigned all-black crews. 
Their white petty officers were supposed to be replaced 
with blacks, but this was accomplished on only one of the 
vessels. 
The Army Air Force held to the stereotype that blacks 
were not capable of performing in combat roles. However, 
blacks did eventually serve as airmen, by participating in 
a program designed to train civilian pilots, who could 
then be inducted into the service if needed. Named the 
"Tuskegee Experiment" for the airfield where black pilots 
trained, the implementation of black airmen in World War 
II proved very successful. It demonstrated once again 
that blacks could function in positions of authority, and 
in positions requiring a high level of technical training. 
The Tuskegee Experiment prompted the military, and in 
particular the Army Air Force, to question its policies on 
the use of black service members. 
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Despite the historical pattern of excluding blacks as 
much as possible from military service, discussions by 
both black and white groups led to the conclusion that a 
more viable and cost-effective military force would result 
from equal opportunity within the services (DOD 1985, p. 
38) and that only a desegregated military could move 
blacks toward "full participation in the benefits and 
responsibilities of American citizenship" (MacGregor 1981, 
p. 13.). These findings helped mitigate racist fears of 
military leaders, and gave President Harry s. Truman the 
grounds he needed to include racial desegregation of the 
military as a part of his 1948 message to Congress on the 
issue of Civil Rights. 
The following sections analyze and discuss how public 
opinion and perception of racial desegregation of the 
military was reflected in the media in the years 
surrounding the order. 
Findings 
It is assumed that the positions of the U.S. military 
and the American public on the issue of racial 
desegregation in the military will be reflected in the 
news media. Articles found in the New York Times Index 
were culled for statements illustrating the arguments for 
and against efforts to desegregate the U.S. military, as 
discussed in Chapter III, "Methodology." 
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Statements or parts of statements found in the 
articles were categorized according to the stance they 
took toward racial desegregation. Two of the articles 
discussed racial issues in the military without mentioning 
the debate over desegregation at all. These two articles 
were not used in the analysis. 
The exclusionist and reformist stances were then 
analyzed by the rationale they used to support their 
positions. These included all four of the rationales 
described in the previous chapter-- "ideological," 
"interdependent," "self-categorical," or "bureaucratic." 
In Table I are summarized the data collected from 29 
New York Times articles spanning the two-year period 
surrounding the Executive Order that compelled the 
military to enforce racial desegregation. This summary 
includes only the contents of those articles which 
contained at least one statement that could be fit into 
one of the eight sub-categories. The articles yielded a 
total of 97 relevant statements. Two of the original 31 
articles listed in the New York Times Index discussed race 
in the military without making any reference to 
desegregation, and therefore did not yield any useable 
data. 
Analysis 
The most notable pattern found in the New York Times 
articles analyzed in this section was an overwhelming 
support of President Truman's plan for racial 
desegregation of the military. Seventy-three percent of 
the statements culled from the New York Times articles 
contained themes that supported the reformist viewpoint. 
TABLE I 
DISTRIBUTION OF 97 STATEMENTS FAVORING AND OPPOSING 
RACIAL DESEGREGATION IN THE U.S. MILITARY 
JULY 26, 1947 TO JULY 26, 1949 
STANCE 
Exclusionist Reformist 
I 
Total 
RATIONALE n ( % ) n (%) n ( % ) 
Ideological 6 ( 6. 2) 57 (58.8) 63 (65.0) 
Interdependence 6 ( 6. 2) 0 (0.0) 6 ( 6. 2) 
Self-Categorical 10 (10.3) 7 ( 7. 2) 17 (17.5) 
Bureaucratic 4 ( 4. 1) 7 ( 7. 2) 11 (11.3) 
I Total II 26 (26.8) I 71 (73.2) II 97 (100.0) 
Almost 59 percent of the statements expressed 
I 
I 
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specifically ideological reasons that the military should 
desegregate. Although ideological concepts do not explain 
how military service members would better interact with 
one another under desegregation, they have proved to be 
the most common arguments of reformists. The standard 
ideological argument of reformists is best illustrated by 
President Truman's message to Congress on civil rights, 
delivered Feb 3, 1948 [R3]. Following is the part of 
Truman's message that dealt with the military. (Relevant 
statements are underlined.) 
During the recent war and in the years since 
its close, we have made much progress toward 
equality of opportunity in our Armed Services 
without regard to race, color, religion or 
national origin. I have instructed the 
Secretary of Defense to take steps to have the 
remaining instances of discrimination in the 
Armed Services eliminated as rapidly as 
possible .... 
I have instructed the Secretary of the Army to 
investigate the status of civil rights in the 
Panama canal Zone with a view to eliminating 
such discrimination as may exist there .... 
The position of the United States in the 
world today makes it especially urgent that we 
adopt these measures to secure for all our 
people their essential rights. 
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This particular article yielded five statements classified 
as ideological in character, and supporting the reformist 
view of race in the military. No mention is made of 
threats to "cohesion," "discipline," "good order," or 
"morale." The problems of how service members will 
interact with one another, and how desegregation will 
affect the military are not addressed. 
Statements classified as ideological rationales in 
support of the exclusionist stance constituted 6.2 percent 
of the total number of statements. These were generally 
couched in the rhetoric of those who were afraid of (or 
angered by) desegregation. Some articles articulated the 
exclusionist stance by publishing statements criticizing 
it. For example, one article quotes a spokesman for The 
Committee Against Jim Crow in Military Training and 
Services accusing the Army and Navy of being "hopelessly 
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bogged down in a tradition of segregation" (Rl2]. In this 
example, "military tradition," an exclusionist rationale, 
is criticized by a committee favoring reform. The same 
article reported that Southern Senators feel states' 
rights are usurped by this effort toward equality, while 
so-called Southern extremists are accused of calling for 
white supremacy. Finally, Representative John E. Rankin 
of Mississippi asserted that both the Democratic and 
Republican stands on these issues were "communistic." 
This article (Rl2] alone produced four ideological 
statements illustrating the exclusionist point of view: 
military tradition, states' rights, white supremacy, and 
anti-communism. 
Analysis of interdependent rationales yielded none 
that supported the reformist argument for desegregation. 
Again, 6.2 percent of the statements supported the 
exclusionist position. These cited threats to the 
efficiency of units, implying a threat to the 
interdependence of units. Quotes included references to 
impaired efficiency [Rll], military expediency [R18], and 
questionable efficiency of the Negroes [R31] as reasons to 
maintain segregation. Each of these statements suggests 
that interdependence is at risk. 
Self-categorical statements were employed in support 
of both exclusionist (10.3 percent) and reformist (7.2 
percent) stances. Exclusionist arguments that were 
classified as self-categorical in character included 
statements that desegregation would stir friction [R7], 
and impair morale [Rll] within the services, and that it 
was unacceptable to the public, because it allegedly did 
not reflect the prevailing culture. As illustrated by 
statements attributed to Gen. Omar N. Bradley, "The Army 
will put men of different races in different companies. 
It will change that policy when the nation as a whole 
changes it" [R16]. The exclusionist preoccupation with 
local opinion, public opinion and community practices 
[R31] showed that people within and outside of the 
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military believed that white and black service members 
were simply too different to risk the desegregation of the 
Armed Forces. 
Reformists using the self-categorical rationale cited 
the precedence of desegregation in some Air Force units to 
support their side. "We had some mixed units in wartime, 
why not do it now?" asked New York Representative Adam C. 
Powell Jr, in a proposal to prohibit racial segregation in 
the Air Force [R7]. The statement reflects the shared 
experience that gives groups cohesion, according to self-
categorical theory. Other "reformist" statements cited 
such things as indoctrination, education, and progressive 
demonstration [R18], all suggesting that the experience of 
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black and white service members working together would 
lead to acceptance of desegregation. 
Finally, the bureaucratic model also supported 
exclusionist (4.1 percent) and reformist (7.2 percent) 
stances. Exclusionist arguments reflected Max Weber's 
bureaucratic model where it concerned organizational 
goals. Goals give organizations their purpose. The goal 
of the Armed Forces is to prevail in battle. Racial 
desegregation is viewed as a change in the military's 
goal-- from winning wars to conducting social experiments. 
Therefore racial desegregation is seen as a threat to the 
military organization. "The Army is not out to make any 
social reforms" [R16], stated the Army Chief of Staff. 
This suggests that a change of goals to include social 
reform might fracture the military organization. 
Exclusionist arguments also included references to Army 
standards for enlistment, which required lower 
intelligence ratings than the other services. It was 
believed that these would encourage a disproportionately 
large number of Negroes to join the Army, and presumably 
cause disruption, because they had poorer educational 
opportunities (which is correlated with lower standardized 
test scores) before entering the service [R31]. 
Reformists cited individual merit and fitness for 
duty as criteria for military service, just as Max Weber 
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suggested in his bureaucratic model that members of an 
organization are rationally assigned to their "off ices" 
based on merit rather than on social differences. One 
reformist argument stated that "any man, regardless of 
race, color, or creed who meets physical, mental or moral 
standards is qualified for enlistment" [R18]. Other 
statements supporting the reformist position included 
references to qualified individuals, qualified Negro 
students, individual merit and ability, and meeting 
prescribed standards for enlistment [R23] [R28]. 
Over all, the summary of the 97 statements regarding 
racial desegregation in the U.S. military (Table I) shows 
that the large majority of statements 73.2 percent, 
supported the reformist stance. Several factors might 
help account for these results. An examination of the 
possible explanations follows. 
The Political Context 
When President Harry s. Truman signed the Executive 
Order establishing equal opportunity for all races in the 
U.S. military, public opinion -- as reflected by articles 
in The New York Times -- was marked by indifference. 
Little debate on the issue was reflected in the media. 
Public opinion is shaped by political climate, and 1948 
saw two major issues emerging that might have distracted 
the public from the issue of military desegregation. 
67 
First, in July of 1948, people were becoming very 
active in the Civil Rights movement. Black leaders, 
particularly members of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, were calling for racial 
equality on all fronts of American life, not just in the 
military. Their movement had wide public support by both 
blacks and whites. Earlier in the year, President Truman 
had presented to the Congress his proposals on civil 
rights. In addition to ending discrimination in the 
military, the proposals included strengthening existing 
civil rights statutes, preventing discrimination in 
employment and transportation facilities, providing 
federal protection against lynching and more adequately 
protecting the right to vote [R3]. Open hostility toward 
these civil rights proposals was largely limited to 
Southern states. 
Second, President Truman's Executive Order to 
desegregate the military was only one of two Orders that 
he gave on July 26, 1948. The other Order instituted a 
fair employment practices policy throughout the civil 
branch of the federal government. The second Order would 
have a more direct affect on the majority of U.S. 
citizens, most of whom were not in the military. The fact 
that the President gave two Orders on the same day, and 
because military desegregation was only a part of a much 
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more sweeping civil rights plan, the impact of 
desegregation in the military was largely diffused. This 
is illustrated in the New York Times articles that reveal 
little controversy on the issue of military desegregation. 
The Military Context 
The military itself was dealing with several 
important issues during the decade in which President 
Truman gave his Order to desegregate. First, the end of 
World War II forced the military to undergo rapid 
demobilization and significant downsizing. Further, two 
major branches of the U.S. military were in the process of 
being re-defined as the U.S. Army's "Army Air Force" 
became a separate service -- the U.S. Air Force -- in 
1947. Then in 1948 when the Women's Armed Service 
Integration Act authorized women in the Regular Army, 
Navy, Air Force and Marines Corps, a plan for their use in 
the services had to be created. At the same time, several 
bodies of military law, including the Articles of War 
(Chapter II of the National Defense Act), were being 
revamped and consolidated into what would become (in 1951) 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
Finally, desegregation proved to be more cost-
effective than separating black and white troops. Under a 
policy of segregation, the military not only had to absorb 
the cost of separate units, but it also had to maintain 
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separate recreational and other facilities. Desegregation 
then became simply a way to deal with inefficiency 
{MacGregor 1981, p. 614} rather than a way to address 
civil rights concerns. 
The internal transformations that the military 
underwent in the late 1940s, like the political climate at 
that time, had the effect of diffusing the impact of 
racial desegregation of the services. Although some open 
opposition to the President's Order did exist, 
particularly on the part of Army Secretary Kenneth Royall, 
most of the services did, in fact, begin to implement 
plans for the use of minorities on a more equal basis. 
One notable point regarding the racial desegregation 
of the U.S. military is that it occurred several years 
before the 1954 Supreme Court decision Brown v. Board of 
Education of Topeka which deemed "separate but equal" 
policies of segregation as inherently unequal, and 
therefore unconstitutional. The military, in this case, 
lead civilian society in banning race-based discriminatory 
policies, although such discrimination is still a de facto 
part of both military and civilian societies. 
WOMEN 
Introduction 
Examinations of military organizations throughout the 
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world have always focused upon male service members, 
because women, even when included in military service, 
have traditionally been excluded from combat roles. Males 
routinely carried arms, but the arming of women was 
largely limited to states of siege (Rustad 1982, p. 5). 
Therefore the military, as an androcentric institution, 
has ignored much of its history and depth of understanding 
where women's participation is concerned. 
Military organization, besides having the manifest 
function of defending a society, has traditionally been an 
avenue for young men to demonstrate their masculinity. 
Women in a military organization, then, may be viewed by 
men as an unknown, or even an unnatural element, a factor 
which can disrupt the male bonding which sustains cohesion 
within small all-male units. For this reason (and 
others), the participation of women in the United States 
military, as in other militaries, has been sharply 
circumscribed. 
A brief review of women's participation in the U.S. 
military through 1948, when the Women's Armed Service Act 
allowed women into the regular armed forces and combat 
exclusions were codified, is given below. However, the 
data gathered for analysis of attitudes toward women's 
participation are drawn from the period surrounding March 
22, 1979, the deadline for ratification of the proposed 
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Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. As 
discussed below, it was during this period that women's 
participation in the U.S. military came under 
extraordinarily intense scrutiny. 
Historical Perspective 
Women's participation in the Continental Army of the 
Revolutionary War was largely limited to such support 
duties as cooking, sewing, cleaning laundry, washing 
bandages, and tending the wounds of male combatants. They 
did not directly participate in armed conflict except 
under the most extreme circumstances. For example, when 
members of an artillery crew were wounded and unable to 
fire their weapon, "Molly Pitcher," the wife of a soldier, 
cleaned, loaded and fired the weapon until a relief crew 
arrived. The true identity of Molly Pitcher is in 
dispute, but her actions on the field of battle were not 
unusual. Women had opportunities to engage in some combat 
activities, simply because they were closely attending to 
men in combat conditions. 
During the 18th and 19th centuries, women were 
routinely present with the armies in battle. 
Indeed, with the constant notorious manpower 
shortages, sustaining Washington's army in field 
or in garrison would have been next to 
impossible without the women. Moreover, it was 
common and accepted practice for poor but 
respectable wives, mothers and even daughters, 
to go along with their men when they went off 
with the army; often they had no other practical 
alternative .... 
The women's civilian status did not shield 
them from the grit, grime, and hardships, nor 
did their lack of military training protect them 
from the horrors of war and the personal risks 
they faced in the daily performance of their 
assigned tasks (Holm 1982, p. 4). 
While women were not allowed to officially 
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participate in U.S. military actions prior to the Spanish-
American War, some women would go to extraordinary lengths 
to serve. Some wanted to join their husbands or loved 
ones on the battle front, while others were more 
interested in joining the fight. There are several known 
cases of women disguising themselves as men in order to 
serve as soldiers. Of these, the best known are Deborah 
Sampson, who served for three years in the Continental 
Army as "Robert Shirtliffe" before being discovered; Lucy 
Brewer, the "first girl marine," who served for three 
years aboard the USS Constitution as "George Baker" in the 
War of 1812; and Loretta Velasquez who served in the Civil 
War and fought in the Battle of Bull Run as "Lt. Harry T. 
Buford" (Holm 1982, p. 5; Rustad 1982, p. 19). Estimates 
of the number of women who disguised themselves as men and 
served on either side of the Civil War are as high as four 
hundred (Holm 1982, p. 6) 
The greater and greater lethal power of weapons in 
the Civil War brought a critical need for professional 
medical care in the field. Women who tended the wounds of 
soldiers had once been viewed as nothing more than camp-
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following prostitutes, but, out of necessity, the military 
began to recruit more highly trained nurses, whose status 
matured into a patriotic professionalism. In 1901, the 
Spanish-American War brought women their first formal 
support role in the U.S. military: the Army Nurse Corp. 
The field of nursing gave legitimacy to women's 
participation, and eventually would lead to their 
expanding roles in the U.S. military (Rustad 1982, p. 21). 
The First World War brought to the U.S. military a 
huge shortage of telephone operators, administrators, and 
clerical workers. In order to fulfill the need, the 
Department of the Navy, in March of 1917, authorized the 
inclusion of women in the Navy Reserve as yeomen, radiomen 
and other essential ratings. This allowed the Navy to 
avoid critical manpower shortages, and to free up men for 
combat duty. The Marine Corps later followed suit, but 
the War Department was reluctant to allow women to serve 
in the Army in any capacity other than nursing. At the 
war's end, more than 34,000 women had served in the U.S. 
Army and Navy Nurse Corps, the Navy, the Marines, and the 
Coast Guard (Holm 1982, p.10). 
The disparities between the services in the levels of 
women's participation is a reflection of the prejudices of 
the male service Secretaries, illustrating again how such 
prejudices can lead to institutionalized discrimination: 
Although all the services were working within 
essentially the same legal constraints, the 
critical element of difference between the 
decisions of the Navy and those of the Army on 
enlisting women was the attitudes of the two 
service Secretaries. The Navy Secretary saw the 
need for military women, and, if he had 
reservations, he overcame them; the Secretary of 
War was unalterably opposed to the idea and 
would not concede the need despite overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary. 
Had the war continued much longer, the 
manpower crunch, coupled with pressures from his 
commanders ..• might have forced the Secretary of 
War to capitulate. But the war ended in 
November 1918, and the subject was shelved with 
an official sigh of relief (Holm 1982, p. 14). 
Because the United States did not have to contend 
with personnel shortages as critical as those faced by 
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European nations during the First World War, women's roles 
in the U.S. military closely followed their gender role 
expectations. Their participation was limited to "women's 
work" within the male-dominated military. During the 
period of military drawdown at the war's end, women were 
the first to be discharged from the services. At home 
they were the first to lose their male-dominated civilian 
jobs when men returned from the war (Rustad 1982, p. 25). 
During World War II and the following decade 
opportunities for women in the military greatly expanded. 
In May of 1942, the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) 
was created, and in July of 1943, the first WAAC 
battalion, composed of 555 women, was sent overseas for 
duty. The WAAC gave women only limited military status, 
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but in September of 1943 it was replaced by the Women's 
Army Corps (WAC), which gave women full military status 
and benefits (Rustad 1982, p. 28). Women also worked with 
the Navy as Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service 
(WAVES); the Coast Guard as SPARS (a contraction of the 
Coast Guard motto, "Semper Paratus," -- Always Ready); and 
in the Marine Corps Women's Reserve. Women in the Air 
Force (WAF) was formed in 1947, when the Air Force became 
a separate service. 
Despite women's greatly increased participation in 
the military during World War II, they faced a lack of 
acceptance of their military role by both military men and 
civilians. When the media examined women's participation 
in the WAC, the focus was on such trivial matters as 
girdles, whether or not women would salute, and whether or 
not they would march. Men's opinions of women in the 
services generally fit one of two stereotypes: that of the 
whore or the lesbian. Jealous wives of soldiers and other 
civilian women resented WACs as possible competition for 
men. Political and religious fanatics could not accept 
the idea that women could be any place other than the home 
(Rustad 1982, p. 30-31). 
Within days of the end of World War II, the Army 
forced the WAC to dismiss 98 percent of its members 
(Rustad 1982, p. 34), and women's familiar pattern of 
disposable service in the military and civilian job 
sectors began again. It appeared that women's inclusion 
in the services was based not on a desire to establish 
equal rights and opportunities for women, but rather a 
simple attempt to address personnel shortages within the 
services. 
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In June of 1948, Congress passed the Women's Armed 
Services Act of 1948 (Public Law 625). The Act gave women 
a permanent place in the regular and reserve Army, Navy, 
Marines and Air Force of the United States, with full 
military status and benefits. However, it limited the 
numbers of women to two percent of the total force, and 
also limited women's attainable rank. Further, the new 
law maintained the Women's Army Corps as a separate 
organization within the Army. Army women who were not 
members of the Nurse or Women's Medical Specialist Corps 
were required to be members of the WAC. The other 
services had no such stipulations. 
Most important, however, was the exclusion of women 
from combat assignments. The combat exclusion, as the key 
stipulation to allowing women to serve in the regular 
forces, was codified in federal law. The Air Force 
prohibited "female members of the Air Force [from being] 
assigned to duty in aircraft engaged in combat missions" 
(United States Codes, title 10, section 8549); while the 
Navy and Marine Corps stipulated that 
women may not be assigned to duty on vessels or 
in aircraft that are engaged in combat missions, 
nor may they be assigned to other than temporary 
duty vessels of the Navy ..• not expected to be 
assigned combat missions (United States Codes, 
title 10, section 6015). 
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No law barred women from being assigned combat duty in the 
Army because the WAC had its own regulations which 
prohibited women from filling combat roles. The Army 
drafted its own combat exclusion policy in 1979 when the 
WAC was dissolved and women were allowed into a 
desegregated Army. 
The rank and number limits had the effect of 
discouraging women from enlisting in the military 
services, and preventing women from gaining power or 
prestige once they were in. Because they were denied 
combat assignment, "women were, for all practical 
purposes, automatically excluded from participation in the 
primary mission of the armed forces, and their second-
class status was thus assured" (Holm 1982, p. 127). 
In 1967, a new law repealed the two percent limit and 
allowed for the advancement of women into the ranks of 
senior officer. The restrictions on combat duty, however, 
remained. 
The different codes and regulations, and different 
definitions of "combat role" between the services has led 
to many inconsistencies and contradictions: A 1989 
examination of women's role in the armed forces showed 
that the Air Force and Army had opened their heavy-
engineer ing units to women, but the Navy had not, saying 
engineering crews work too closely with combat forces. 
The Navy allowed women to fly fighter planes as 
instructors, while the Air Force did not (Moore 1989). 
78 
The Coast Guard allowed women to serve on any of its 
aircraft or vessels, some of which would have combat roles 
under the aegis of the Navy in times of war, while the 
Navy continued to bar women from service on all Navy 
combat ships. 
The importance of the combat exclusion is illustrated 
by the Supreme Court's 1981 decision to exclude women from 
the draft, reasoning that because the draft is used to 
bring combat troops into the armed services in times of 
war, there was no reason to apply it to women. 
The combat exclusion would remain intact until 1993, 
when it was altered by the Secretary of Defense. Women 
may now be assigned to combat aircraft and ships, although 
the service Secretaries are not required to make such 
assignments. Despite these changes, combat exclusions 
still cover such service occupations as armor, field or 
air defense artillery units, infantry units, and a variety 
of combat support units. 
The following sections analyze and discuss how public 
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opinion and perception of the possibilities that women 
might be subjected to the draft or to combat are reflected 
in the media in the years surrounding the def eat of the 
Equal Rights Amendment. 
Findings 
Summarized in Table II are the data collected from 50 
New York Times articles listed within a 700-day window 
surrounding March 22, 1979, the original deadline for 
passage of the Equal Rights Amendment. The New York Times 
Index listings were searched backward and forward from 
March 22, 1979 one day at a time until the 50 appropriate 
entries were found. This method of searching produced a 
window of time from April 6, 1978 to March 7, 1980, 350 
days before and 350 days after the original March 22, 1979 
ERA ratification deadline. Eight articles mentioned the 
issues of women and the draft, and/or women in combat 
without making any statements either in support or 
opposition. The content analysis of the remaining 42 
articles yielded 203 statements which could be classified 
as rationales supporting or opposing the drafting of women 
and their use in military combat roles. 
Analysis 
Unlike the question of racial desegregation, which 
produced an overwhelming number of "reformist" statements, 
the issue of subjecting women to the draft or to combat 
produced a more evenly divided set of statements. 
TABLE II 
DISTRIBUTION OF 203 STATEMENTS IN FAVOR OF, AND OPPOSITION TO 
SUBJECTING WOMEN TO COMBAT DUTY AND/OR THE DRAFT 
IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY 
APRIL 6, 1978 TO MARCH 7, 1980 
STANCE 
Exclusionist Reformist 
I 
Total 
I RATIONALE n ( % ) n ( % ) n ( % ) 
Ideological 14 ( 6. 9) 70 (34.5) 84 ( 41. 4) 
Interdependence 2 ( 1. 0) 0 (0.0) 2 ( 1. 0) 
Self-Categorical 40 ( 19. 7) 3 ( 1. 5) 43 (21.2) 
Bureaucratic 49 (24.1) 25 (12.3) 74 (36.4) 
I Total II 105 (51.7) I 98 (48.3) II 203 (100.0) I 
Slightly less than half (48.3 percent) of the statements 
could be classified as reformist. However, the largest 
single category of statements, which constituted 34.5 
percent of the total, were ideological arguments 
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supporting the reformist stance. These cited such things 
as equal rights of women [Wl], and women's sharing of 
responsibility for helping with national defense [W31] as 
reasons that women should be subject to the draft and 
allowed to serve in combat duty. These "rights and 
responsibilities" regarding the military are viewed as the 
route to fair treatment of women in civilian society as 
well: 
Omission from the registration and the draft 
ultimately robs women of the right to first-
class citizenship and paves the way to 
underpaying women all the remaining days of 
[their] lives [W44]. 
Further, it is suggested that a male-only draft actually 
violates the constitutional rights of men, by placing an 
unfair share of risk upon them [W44]. 
A much smaller number of statements, 6.9 percent of 
the total, supported the exclusionist stance with the 
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ideological rationale. Ideological statements supporting 
the exclusionist position cited such things as traditional 
morality and religious ideals [W35] as reasons to bar 
women from the draft and combat. One suggested that an 
all-inclusive military would force women to submit to"··· 
men who merely wish to exploit women with ever more brutal 
efficiency" [W3]. Another exclusionist position even 
suggested that the President's call to register women for 
the draft would actually suppress their attempts to gain 
equal rights: 
[I]n calling for the registration of women for 
military service, [President] Carter has not 
only hurt the chances of any draft for national 
service, but also postponed, if he has not 
defeated, the Equal Rights Amendment to the 
Constitution [W36]. 
The reformist stance employed very few arguments 
classified within the small group concepts of 
interdependence or self-categorical models of group 
cohesion. Reformist arguments included no 
"interdependence" statements at all in support of the idea 
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of greater involvement of women in the military, and 
employed only three statements, 1.5 percent of the total, 
that could be classified as self-categorical. These 
included references to increased military group loyalty 
when women are included in the draft [W4], the precedence 
of World War II and Vietnam where women served in combat 
[W31], and again more shared identity derived from the 
experience with women as spies, saboteurs, and assault 
troops (W39]. 
The exclusionist stance was supported by only two 
statements (1 percent of the total) classified as the 
interdependent rationale, both citing threats to combat 
effectiveness if women were included in fighting units 
[W39]. However 40 statements could be classified as self-
categorical, many more than employed by the reformist 
stance. Exclusionist statements cited mostly gender role 
expectations as reasons not to include women in the draft 
or combat. Statements that parents do not raise their 
girls to be soldiers [W4], that combat is no job for a 
young lady (WlO], that women don't belong on the battle 
field [W16], that the military should be prevented from 
taking our women folk [W38], and that suggestions to 
conscript and assign women to combat roles stabbed 
American womanhood in the back [W31] were typical 
rationalizations for excluding women from expanded roles 
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in the military. These rationalizations viewed the draft 
and combat as an affront to "womanhood," or femininity. 
Other self-categorical arguments viewed women's military 
participation as an affront to the masculinity of male 
service members. Typical statements referred to male 
service members' hostility toward women, and men's sense 
of superior masculinity [W39], which would be threatened 
by the presence of armed female soldiers. Other 
statements cited the chivalrous impulse of men toward 
women [W15], the social proscription that men must protect 
and defend women [W3], and the disruptions which might 
occur because men and women in the services might be 
attracted to each other [W2]. One revealing argument is 
the idea that the military builds men and is an important 
agent of socialization and enhancement of young men [W3], 
which, by default, must mean that women and feminine 
traits do not belong in the military. 
The most frequent self-categorical argument employed 
by the exclusionist position, then, appears to revolve 
around supposedly intractable differences between gender 
roles, and in particular, a perceived threat to 
masculinity. Placating male service members then becomes 
very important, because the creation of a sense of 
manliness is viewed as a meaningful benefit of military 
service: 
One purpose of military training is to reduce 
individual differences and to make men as nearly 
as possible into replaceable units. A soldier's 
compensation for his loss of individuality is in 
participating in a group identity-- and the more 
specific that identity, the more compelling. 
To draft women is necessarily to diffuse this 
collective identity-- to change the very idea of 
what a soldier is. 
In the absence of a national emergency that 
would bind soldiers and civilians, men and 
women, together in a common purpose, the 
drafting of women takes away whatever fun there 
is in being a soldier [W39]. 
The bureaucratic rationale was employed by both the 
reformist and exclusionist stances. Twenty-four percent 
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of the total number of statements were classified as using 
the bureaucratic rationale to support the exclusionist 
stance. This accounted for the largest number of 
statements supporting the exclusionist stance. Many of 
these cited physiological differences between men and 
women, which supposedly made men more individually 
qualified for combat roles. Statements included 
assertions that biological differences between the sexes 
made men more aggressive, competitive, risk-taking. indeed 
more combative, than women [W3]. Men were given credit 
for having greater aptitude for group leadership than 
women [W3]. Other statements raised questions of women's 
capability [W9], women's lack of physical strength and 
their " ... problems every month" [W32]. Finally, citing a 
larger organizational context, statements suggested that 
the military had no need to draft women, that registering 
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women was unnecessary and economically unjustified because 
no manpower shortages existed [W50], and that the 
conscription of women had no military justification [W41], 
especially given the then-current ban on women filling 
combat roles. 
The bureaucratic rationale accounted for fewer 
statements in support of the reformist stance. Twenty-
five "bureaucratic" statements, constituting only 12.3 
percent of the total, supported the reformist position. 
These statements asserted that no distinction could be 
made between women and men based on ability or performance 
(W29] and that individual ability is a more important 
factor for determining competence than sex roles (Wl]. 
Bureaucratic statements further asserted that women 
offered a greater reservoir of quality recruits than the 
male population [Wl], and that women service members were 
better educated and accounted for less lost time than men 
[W30). Finally, statements suggested that the military 
needed the flexibility made possible by expanding women's 
roles [WlO], and that doing so would save money [Wl]. 
In summary, the 203 statements regarding the possible 
conscription and assignment of women to combat roles in 
the U.S. military {Table II) appeared to slightly favor 
the discriminatory military policy. The data show that a 
marginally greater number of statements, 51.7 percent, 
86 
supported the exclusionist position. Factors which might 
help account for these results are outlined in the 
following sections. 
The Political Context 
The March 22, 1979 deadline for the ratification of 
the Equal Rights Amendment, besides generating debate on 
women's rights in American society, also had the effect of 
focusing public scrutiny on the situation of women in the 
United States military. Proponents of the ERA generally 
took the position that equal rights for women required 
accepting equal responsibility for national defense, 
including the possibility of conscription and combat 
assignment for women. That principle may have destroyed 
any chance the ERA had for ratification (Mansbridge 1990). 
As one antiratificationist pamphlet warned readers, "Watch 
out, they're going to draft your daughter!" (Mathews and 
DeHart 1990, p. 137). 
The status of women in the military became a 
microcosm of their status in society, as the Equal Rights 
Amendment was demonized by opponents as an attack on 
"womanhood." The possibility of drafting women and 
assigning them to combat was a rallying point also for the 
proratif ication side, who hoped to push the ongoing 
"gender revolution" to its natural conclusion, equal 
rights for the sexes. 
It is true that the dissonance between 
traditional womanhood and woman warriors made 
the draft-combat issue the most damaging of 
those raised by the opposition [to the ERA] .•.. 
The anomaly of women warriors was too powerful 
for the opponents to surrender no matter what 
the facts. As for proponents, the gender 
revolution made it virtually impossible for them 
to have hidden from the logic of their position 
even if they had wanted to do so (Mathews and 
DeHart 1990, p. 140). 
The Cold War shaped many military policy-making 
decisions in the years surrounding March 22, 1979. The 
national attention given to the status of women in the 
military was further intensified by international 
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political factors, which made the danger to U.S. military 
women seem more real and immediate. 
First, President Carter, in his January 1980 State of 
the Union Address, had proposed reinstating the draft for 
men, and possibly women, as a response to the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. This invasion, the Soviet 
Union's first attack on an independent nation outside of 
the Warsaw Pact since World War II, was seen as a threat 
to the United States' vital interests, including Persian 
Gulf oil resources. Second, in September of 1979, rumors 
of a Soviet combat brigade stationed in Cuba led the U.S. 
government to believe that the Russians had "several 
thousand troops less than 100 miles from our shores" [W8], 
a rumor which eventually proved false [W49]. Finally, the 
rise of Islamic militancy, especially in Iran, was 
perceived as yet another potential military threat from 
abroad, both to Persian Gulf oil supplies and as a 
possible terrorist menace. 
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The general fear of the Soviet military superpower 
during the Cold War, combined with foreign military 
excursions, generated real fear in the United States that 
the U.S. military might be pulled into an overseas 
conflict, and that U.S. military personnel, both male and 
female, could face combat situations. Public opinion on 
these issues was important for two reasons. First because 
public opinion "affects the decisions of elected officials 
and second, because it affects public support for the 
military" (Stiehm 1989, p. 189). Public opinion, as 
measured by statements culled from the New York Times, 
suggests that the American public was divided on the issue 
of subjecting women to military conscription and to combat 
assignments. 
The Military Context 
The problems for the United States military in the 
years surrounding March 22, 1979 were twofold. First, the 
military was generally unpopular. The Vietnam war had 
given the U.S. military its first ever defeat. The war 
had been protracted and highly unpopular, both in the 
military and in civilian socie~y. Rather than the 
celebrations following World War I and World War II, or 
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the indifference following the Korean War, service members 
returning home from Vietnam faced ridicule and hostility. 
Male service members were accused of being baby-killers 
and drug addicts, while the morals of women service 
members were called into question, to the point that it 
was believed by some that they had participated in the war 
merely to "service the troops." The hostile attitude 
toward the post-Vietnam military added credence to the 
idea that "good" women did not belong there. 
Second, the discontinuation of the draft in 1972, and 
the beginning of the all-volunteer force in 1973 left the 
military with potentially severe manpower shortages. The 
House Armed Services Committee believed that the all-
volunteer military forces had "failed to meet the nation's 
needs," and that it was necessary to resume registration 
to create a bigger pool of potential draftees for the 
Selective Service System [W8]. Because the reinstatement 
of the draft (for males) seemed inevitable, the greater 
question became the issue of whether or not to include 
women in the draft. A practical argument against 
including women in the draft was the simple fact that they 
were legally prevented from serving in combat roles, and 
filling requirements for personnel in combat roles was the 
usual reason for conscription. Therefore, contemplating 
women's subjection to the draft necessarily meant 
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rethinking their use for possible combat assignment. 
The practical argument in favor of including women in 
the draft was the question of the constitutionality of a 
male-only draft. This challenge might come from men who 
resented being singled out for military servitude, or from 
women who resented being excluded from the career 
opportunities available to military service members. 
White House officials believed that a lawsuit "challenging 
the male-only program as unconstitutional could be 
successful in blocking the whole program" [W40], a 
contingency that could further erode military readiness. 
Reports on the use of women in the military suggested 
that "the female population offered a 'greater reservoir 
of quality recruits than the male population' and that 
greater utilization of women would save money for the 
military" [Wl]. This indicated a practical advantage to 
women's inclusion in the draft. Proponents of the Equal 
Rights Amendment summed up the expected impact of the ERA 
on women's status in the military as such: 
It was intended that women be allowed to 
volunteer for military service on the same basis 
as do men. It is likely that both men and women 
who meet the physical and other requirements, 
and who are not exempt or deferred by law, would 
be subject to conscription, if a draft law is in 
force, and would be assigned to various duties 
(including combat) depending on their 
qualifications and the service's needs .... 
Responding to fears that mothers would be taken 
from their children into military service under 
the ERA, supporters in Congress noted that 
Congress would retain ample power to create 
legitimate sex-neutral exemptions from 
compulsory service (e.g., exempting both male 
and female parents with children under eighteen 
years of age [Boles 1979, p. 34, emphasis in 
original]). 
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This expected impact of the ERA may have sounded like 
a completely new concept for the use of women in the U.S. 
military. However, prior to the end of World War II, 
Congress was in fact quietly beginning the "process of 
enacting a law to draft unmarried, unemployed women into 
the services as being more logical than drafting men away 
from their families" [W16]. During the prolonged European 
conflict, the practical need to deal with personnel 
shortages overcame any reluctance to subjecting women to 
the draft. One conclusion that might be drawn is that the 
gender-role-based reluctance to subject women to the draft 
and combat assignment can only be overcome by the most 
severe of circumstances, the widespread belief that the 
very existence of America is at stake. 
A Feminist Perspective 
To a large extent, exclusionist arguments that are 
self-categorical in character rely on arcane, immeasurable 
ideas about the nature of males and females, and their 
"natural" relationship to each other. It may well boil 
down to the belief that combat is not "lady-like," or that 
engaging in combat is a distinctly male responsibility. 
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In this case, the very definition of femininity is 
associated with the need to be protected, and, conversely, 
masculinity is associated with the male's ability to 
provide that protection. As explained by Rogan (1981, pp. 
296-297) in a study of women in the U.S. Army: 
Male soldiers have always thought of women as 
small and weak, the people whom wars are fought 
to protect. Female deaths in combat imply a 
failure to protect, and therefore a failure of 
masculinity. The combat debate is so fierce not 
because of reluctance to expose women to the 
enemy but because men do not want women on their 
own side. The problem is not women's 
incapability. It is a problem of men's 
incapability if women are beside them, even 
leading them, particularly when women are armed 
aggressors .... Women soldiers deprive men of 
their masculinity by showing that soldiering is 
not so terribly hard and by usurping the 
profession. This is why men ... insist on the 
need to protect women. This is why they 
emphasize physical toughness and combat. This 
is why they would rather protect women than 
teach them to protect themselves or to protect 
men (emphasis in original). 
The obvious conclusion that can be drawn is that men 
do not protect women for women's benefit, or for the 
benefit of society as a whole, but to reinforce their own 
superior status within society. The feminist concept of 
"the pedestal" becomes relevant here. Men, including 
military men, supposedly "worship" women, and protect them 
by putting them on "the pedestal," only to react with 
vengeance if women do not wish to stay there. (Note here 
that "the pedestal" is more accessible to white women than 
to women of color, who are less valued and face unique 
forms of prejudice.) Rogan's point is reinforced by a 
remarkably similar observation made by Stiehm (1981, p. 
292) in a study of women in the Air Force Academy: 
Is it not possible that men's aversion to 
women's suffering is based on their feeling that 
a suffering woman implies men's failure to be 
protective? Thus the pain men feel may derive 
not from sympathy but from a feeling of 
failure .... The fact, of course, is that in war 
men on both sides terribly and regularly hurt 
women on the other side. Half the victims in 
any war are "noncombatants"-- largely women, 
children and the elderly. Quite obviously, a 
desire to avoid hurting women does not control 
men's behavior. At best, men do not want 
"their" women hurt. In fact men do not object 
to having women in combat so much as they object 
to having women on their side. This is 
important. It means that even if some women are 
physically able and are so moved by logic or 
their sense of justice as to insist upon sharing 
war's risk, their offer will probably be 
refused. Men do not want women's assistance in 
the waging of war (emphasis in original). 
The preceding commentary illustrates two points asserted 
by the feminist perspective. First, women are viewed as 
property of the men responsible for protecting them, and 
following this premise, military men use the rape and 
murder of women who "belong" to the enemy as a tool to 
assert their domination over enemy males. Second, women 
in combat are a threat to male service members because 
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they are a threat to masculinity. Perhaps, from the male 
perspective, military service proves men's toughness and 
masculinity, and therefore any feminine traits exhibited 
by service members (male or female) are despised. This 
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attitude is evidenced in the standard cry of the military 
basic training drill instructor attempting to motivate his 
men: "You ladies look like shit!" In this case, the first 
"expletive" is intended to be far more devastating than 
the second. 
Further, there is a fundamental contradiction in 
feminist positions which could also be interpreted as 
threatening. Feminist philosophy is vehemently opposed to 
organized violence, which is perceived as a patriarchal 
tool of oppression. Yet organized violence is the very 
purpose of a military. Therefore, it may be argued that 
the inclusion of women in military conscription and combat 
assignments would be in opposition to feminism, whatever 
its affect on women's status in the military. 
Finally there may be a perceived threat to military 
readiness, as the inclusion of large numbers of "feminist" 
service members (read: women) threatens to "pacify" the 
military establishment. These last points are well 
illustrated by Reardon (1985, p. 55-56): 
The equal right to serve in the military has 
been viewed by some, even feminists, as a major 
step forward. However, it also should be noted 
that the issue has raised profound controversy 
among women's groups. The traditional peace 
organizations feel that women's resistance to 
military service is a form of struggle against 
war and militarism. Still others believe that 
the presence of women in the military could 
serve to mitigate the savagery of warfare and 
contribute to some prudence in decisions to use 
armed forces-- the presumption being that more 
restraint will be applied if the forces are made 
up equally of women and men .... (C)onscription 
of women into the military and into combat 
forces would help to erode militarism and limit 
the occurrence of warfare. 
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This perceived fundamental contradiction between what 
is "feminist" and what is "feminine" may lie at the center 
of the controversy over women's status in the United 
States military. A similar objection to the participation 
of homosexuals in the military becomes evident in the 
following section. 
HOMOSEXUALS 
Introduction 
A unique difficulty is involved in any attempt to 
examine the participation of homosexuals in the United 
States military. Unlike racial minorities and women, 
homosexuals are an invisible outgroup. Accounts of their 
service are largely anecdotal in nature, because a public 
admission of homosexuality is, and has usually been, 
grounds for discharge. The U.S. military gathers no 
official statistics regarding homosexuals for the purposes 
of comparative studies of service members, as is done for 
racial minorities and women. The only official statistics 
involve separations from service (voluntary or otherwise) 
for the "offense" of homosexuality. Between 1980 and 1991 
such separations numbered nearly 17,000 (RAND 1993, p. 8), 
and cost the military hundreds of millions of dollars 
(Shilts 1993, p. 4). 
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Despite President Clinton's 1993 compromise which 
allowed homosexuals to serve in the military so long as 
they kept their sexual orientation secret, legal 
proscriptions against homosexual acts by service members 
still exist (UCMJ art. 125), and the official Department 
of Defense policy remains that "homosexuality is 
incompatible with military service" (DOD 1982). 
Therefore, homosexual service members who wish to remain 
in the military must hide their sexual orientation in 
order to avoid discharge. As a result, measuring their 
participation, or even their presence in the military, 
involves much speculation, and is typically accomplished 
only after homosexual service members have separated from 
the services. 
Another problem involves the definition of "a 
homosexual." The word may be simply defined by conduct--
that is, any service member who engages in a "homosexual 
act" (observable behavior) could be labeled a homosexual. 
The military, however, carries the definition further-- to 
include people who allegedly have "homosexual tendencies" 
(Army Regulation [AR] 600-443, 1950), regardless of their 
actual behavior. This definition attempts to reach into 
the minds and hearts of service members for unmeasurable 
"evidence" which might prove them incompatible with 
military service. 
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Such characteristics as race and sex are generally 
confirmed with a glance at the surface features of people, 
but "confirming" sexual orientation, by necessity, must be 
done in other ways. These have included gathering 
incriminating statements from suspect service members, 
their families, friends, co-workers and other associates; 
scrutinizing their off-station activities; questioning 
their marital statuses; and even pondering reasons for 
their masculine or feminine personality traits (Humphrey 
1990) . Obviously such criteria leave ample room for 
misinterpretation and mistakes in legal investigations, if 
not opportunity for outright sabotage of military careers. 
Just being homosexual in the military is grounds for an 
"incompatibility" discharge; while committing sodomy, 
defined as a criminal act in the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (sec. 125), may be punishable by prison terms 
ranging from five to 20 years. 
The hostility of the military toward homosexuals is 
magnified by the lack of discretion allowed commanding 
officers in dealing with homosexual service members. 
Commanding officers must instigate investigations into the 
alleged homosexuality of suspect service members, or 
themselves be considered derelict of duty (UCMJ art. 92). 
This policy prevents commanding officers from allowing 
exemptions from discharge for any homosexual, even the 
most valuable and dependable of service members. 
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The contemporary U.S. military has made considerable 
efforts to protect racial minorities and women from 
discrimination in the services, and to provide them with 
as many career opportunities as possible. The official 
status of homosexuals in the services, however, remains 
only slightly different today than it was at the very 
inception of United States military. 
United States military history is replete with 
information about racial minority and women service 
members, because even when these groups were largely 
excluded from the "core" of the military services, they 
were, nonetheless, allowed to serve in lower-status, 
segregated units. Homosexuals in the U.S. military have 
never been segregated into their own units, which might 
have given them an opportunity to prove their abilities in 
military service, or leave a historical mark of some kind. 
Upon discovery, they were usually (and quickly) discharged 
from service. Their history comes from interviews and 
anecdotes provided by past and present service members, 
quietly told in order to avoid repercussions by military 
authorities. Therefore the "history" of homosexuals in 
the U.S. military is most easily illustrated through an 
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examination of the service policies concerning them, 
combined with court cases and literary anecdotes. The 
following section attempts an examination of the status of 
homosexual service members in a historical context. 
Historical Perspective 
Like racial minorities and women, homosexuals have 
always been involved in the defense of the United States. 
The first "known" homosexual service member, a general, 
made significant contributions to the revolutionary 
efforts of George Washington's Continental Army. 
In 1777, Washington was struggling to unify what were 
essentially thirteen separate armies provided by the 
thirteen colonies, all fighting under the same flag. 
Washington's problems were compounded by his own lack of 
military training and experience. The new Continental 
Army desperately needed training. Benjamin Franklin 
attempted to recruit a person he believed could instill 
the training and military discipline necessary to win the 
Revolutionary War-- Baron Frederich Wilhelm Ludolf 
Gerhard Augustin von Steuben, a European military genius. 
Steuben had been an aide to King Frederick II of Prussia, 
Europe's most notorious gay ruler at the time (Shilts 
1993, p. 7), and a brilliant military strategist. 
Steuben's experience and discipline, Franklin believed, 
could give the Continental Army a fighting chance against 
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the well-trained and experienced British forces. Steuben 
abruptly left Europe for America, however, only after 
being accused of " ... having taken familiarities with young 
boys which the law forbids and punishes severely .... " 
(Shilts 1993, p. 8). 
Steuben arrived at Valley Forge on February 23, 1778. 
Washington asked him to review the troops and off er 
suggestions for improvement. Upon inspection, Steuben 
found that some of the regiments drilled in the French 
style, others in the English or Prussian styles. Steuben 
wrote a drill book and formed a model brigade, the members 
of which became drill masters who trained other drill 
masters, eventually unifying the Continental Army. In 
1783, George Washington's last official act as Commander 
in Chief of the Continental Army was to write a letter 
thanking Steuben (Shilts 1993, p. 11). 
General Steuben's acceptance in the military was not 
an indication that homosexuality was acceptable, but 
rather evidence of desperation on the part of the 
military. Two weeks after Steuben's arrival at Valley 
Forge, a general court-martial carried out a punishment 
approved by General Washington, dismissing from service 
Lieutenant Gotthold Frederick Enslin. Enslin had been 
"caught" in his private quarters with an enlisted man, and 
subsequently became the first service member discharged 
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from the U.S. military for homosexuality (Shilts 1993_, p. 
11) • 
Military policy on homosexuals and homosexual acts 
may be divided into two categories: statutes used to 
prosecute service members, and service regulations which 
exclude or discharge members from the services. 
The criminal "offense" of homosexuality first became 
codified in U.S. military law during the First World War. 
The Articles of War of 1916, which became effective March 
1, 1917, listed among its "miscellaneous" crimes and 
offenses assault with the intent to commit sodomy (article 
93). This first proscription included only anal sodomy, 
and only if the act was forcible (MCM 1917, para 443). 
Following the war, Congress enacted new Articles of 
War, which were revised so that both anal and oral sodomy 
became a felonies, whether or not the acts were consensual 
(MCM 1921, para 443). However the crime of forcible 
sodomy still applied only to anal intercourse. 
The law did not change again until 1951, when the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice became the military's new 
body of law. The new law included proscriptions against 
all types of sodomy, forcible or consensual, whether 
committed with opposite- or same-sex partners, or with 
animals (UCMJ art 125). Besides defining more sex acts as 
crimes, the law also increased the allowable maximum 
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punishment. The current maximum punishment for forcible 
sodomy is dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay 
and allowances, and imprisonment for 20 years (Davis 1991, 
p. 74). Even though sodomy has been a court-martial 
offense since 1920, consensual sodomy among service 
members has usually led only to administrative separation 
(Davis 1991, p. 74). 
Current regulations regarding homosexuality differ 
from service to service, but are substantially the same 
because they are based on the same Department of Defense 
directives. Following World War II, both the Army and the 
Navy moved to bar from enlistment all people with 
"homosexual histories" (Davis 1991, p. 74). 
Until 1945, the Army gave dishonorable discharges to 
enlisted members suspected of homosexual conduct because 
of their alleged "inaptness or undesirable habits or 
traits of character" (AR 615-360). In 1945, War 
Department policy changed to allow for the discharge of 
some homosexuals, and the retention of "reclaimable" 
homosexuals. The latter would return to duty after a 
period of psychiatric hospitalization. By March of 1946, 
homosexual service members who had not engaged in 
homosexual conduct could be discharged honorably (Davis 
1991, p. 75). 
In 1948, the military moved toward a less-tolerant 
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policy when the provision for honorable discharge was 
dropped. Homosexuals were classified as "unfit," along 
with criminals, pathological liars, drug addicts, and 
sexual perverts (AR 615-368). 
In 1955, Army Regulations divided homosexuals into 
three categories: Class I homosexuals were those who 
committed homosexual acts involving assault; Class II 
homosexuals were those who committed, or attempted to 
commit consensual homosexual acts; and Class III 
homosexuals were those who exhibited or professed 
homosexual tendencies, even in the absence of homosexual 
conduct. Honorable discharge was reinstated for Class III 
homosexual service members who could provide evidence of 
"heroic" military service; other homosexuals faced 
sanctions ranging from general discharges to prison 
sentences (AR 635-89). 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, homosexuals could 
be discharged as "unfit and unsuitable" (AR 635-200) . 
There were, however, some differences between the services 
concerning the possibility of exemptions from discharge 
for some homosexual service members. 
(S)eparation boards convened pursuant to AR 
635-200 generally had the authority to recommend 
retention of soldiers being processed for 
elimination, (but) commanders could disapprove a 
board's recommendation to separate. This 
provided two loopholes for some homosexuals, 
even though the Army policy was that 
homosexuality is incompatible with military 
service. A similar situation developed with 
officer separations, because the officer 
elimination regulation implied that separation 
was discretionary. Indeed, prior to February 
1977, the Army's litigation posture was that 
there was discretion to retain homosexuals. 
Meanwhile ... the Navy regulation on 
homosexuality, dated July 31, 1972, did not 
provide any terms of exception to the general 
policy of separating homosexuals. In litigation 
in 1974, however, the Navy argued that the 
regulation did not require mandatory discharge 
of homosexuals (Davis 1991, p. 77). 
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The ambiguous service regulations were tested through 
litigation as some homosexual service members attempted to 
retain their military careers. In a 1975 case, an Air 
Force Technical Sergeant applied for an exception to the 
discharge policy, but his request was denied because the 
Air Force claimed his case lacked the "unusual 
circumstances" required to warrant the exception. Further 
frustrating the efforts by homosexual airmen to retain 
their careers is the fact that the Air Force does not 
define "unusual circumstances" (Davis 1991, p. 78). 
In 1980, a Federal Court found that the Army's 
definition of unsuitability due to homosexual "tendencies, 
desires, and interests" was an unconstitutional violation 
of service members' right to privacy. The Army responded 
by changing the definition of "homosexual" so that it 
could retain its policy of exclusion (Davis 1991, p. 78). 
In 1981, AR 635-200 was revised, making it clear that 
any service member fitting the description of "homosexual" 
105 
must be discharged. One year later, the Department of 
Defense issued a directive that made the total exclusion 
policy uniform across the services (DOD 1982). 
This policy remained in effect until 1993 when 
President Clinton's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" compromise 
with the military Service Secretaries allowed homosexuals 
to serve in the military as long as they made no public 
admission of their homosexuality. The primary affect of 
the new policy is that the military services are no longer 
allowed to ask about sexual orientation as a condition of 
recruitment, or promotion of service members. However, 
the policy allows the military to pursue the discharges of 
any service members who admit they are homosexuals, 
regardless of their conduct. 
Some homosexual service members have fought their 
discharges in Federal Appellate Courts, with mixed 
results: a few have been reinstated while the military 
fights their appeals, but most have been honorably 
discharged. Such court cases, and President Clinton's 
campaign promise to lift the ban on homosexual service 
members, have had the affect of focusing public attention 
on the military's exclusionary policy toward homosexuals. 
The following section outlines public perception of the 
reasons for and against the exclusion, as reflected in 
statements culled from New York Times articles surrounding 
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the date of Clinton's policy compromise. 
Findings 
Summarized in Table III are the data collected from 
50 New York Times articles surrounding July 16, 1993, the 
date of announcement of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" 
compromise policy which allowed homosexuals to serve in 
the U.S. military as long as they kept their sexual 
orientations secret. The New York Times Index was 
searched backward and forward from this date until 50 
appropriate entries were found. This method of searching 
produced a window from May 28, 1993, to September 3, 1993, 
49 days before and 49 days after the July 16, 1993 
compromise plan. Four of the articles listed in the New 
York Times Index made references to homosexuals in the 
military without discussing the controversy surrounding 
their service. These four articles contained no useful 
data. Contents of the remaining 46 articles were 
analyzed. 
Analysis 
Despite the heated opposition toward homosexuals 
within the military (as illustrated by military history 
and service policies), the solid majority of statements 
concerning the issue supported the reformist stance. 
TABLE III 
DISTRIBUTION OF 353 STATEMENTS IN FAVOR OF, AND OPPOSITION TO 
ALLOWING HOMOSEXUALS TO SERVE IN THE U.S. MILITARY 
MAY 28, 1993 TO SEPTEMBER 3, 1993 
STANCE 
Exclusionist Reformist 
I 
Total 
I RATIONALE n ( % ) n (%) n ( % ) 
Ideological 14 (4.0) 132 (37.4) 146 ( 41. 4) 
Interdependence 2 (0.6) 15 ( 4. 2) 17 (4.8) 
Self-Categorical 94 (26.6) 9 (2.5) 103 (29.1) 
Bureaucratic 18 ( 5. 1) 69 (19.6) 87 (24.7) 
I Total II 128 (36.3) I 225 ( 63. 7) II 353 (100.0) I 
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Nearly 64 percent of statements suggested that homosexuals 
should be allowed to serve, while only 36 percent 
supported the exclusionary policy. 
Reformist statements about homosexuals followed the 
pattern of reformist statements regarding racial 
minorities and women-- they were largely ideological in 
character, rather than addressing the practical matters of 
cohesion among service members. Thirty-seven percent of 
statements relied on reformist appeals to ideological 
concepts of fairness and equal rights. Typical statements 
cited the fundamental rights of homosexuals [H42], 
principles of fairness and human dignity [H17], equal 
protection guarantees found in the constitution [H44], and 
the abhorrence of discrimination ... based on sexual status 
[H9]. One college student quoted in an article summed up 
reformists' ideological rationale thus: "The military is a 
representative of America, and needs to live up to 
democratic values even if it isn't a democratic 
institution per se" [H9]. 
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By contrast, only four percent of the statements 
supported the exclusionist stance with an ideological 
rationale. Those mostly argued that such things as 
"coming out" is not protected speech (H32], that 
homosexual lifestyles should not be endorsed (H39], that 
homosexuality is an offense to Christian values (Hl], and 
a degradation of morality [H3]. Again, the ideological 
rhetoric does not address the question of cohesion among 
service members at the small-unit level. 
Statements that were classified as interdependent in 
character made up just less than five percent of the total 
number of statements. Reformists argued that service 
members would follow whatever orders they're given [H50], 
implying that doing the job and functioning together is 
more important than getting along. Reformists also assert 
that homosexual service members have served with 
distinction [H13], and continue to serve admirably (H18], 
indicating that heterosexual service members have worked 
with homosexuals, knowingly or unknowingly, without the 
predicted disruption of military organization or 
effectiveness. Another article points out that in time, 
soldiers respect those who get the job done (H15]. 
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Senator Goldwater illustrated the reformist/interdependent 
position when he derided the exclusion as a senseless move 
to eliminate "proven military assets" [Hll]. 
Statements that supported the exclusionist stance 
with an interdependent rationale included only references 
to jeopardized military readiness and combat readiness 
[Hll] [H39], indicating a breakdown of the military 
organization, but without explicitly describing how such 
things are affected by the presence of homosexual service 
members. 
The reformist position rarely used self-categorical 
statements for support. Self-categorical reformist 
statements constituted only 2.5 percent of the total 
statements classified. These few suggested that the 
military had more to fear from macho males than from gays 
[H9], that negative stereotypes had a greater disrupting 
effect than the presence of homosexuals [H30], that~ 
bashing was a problem in the military [H31], and that the 
prejudices of others should not be a reason for excluding 
homosexuals [H32]. All of these statements suggest that 
homosexuals are perceived differently from the majority of 
service members, but the point is made that the problem 
does not lie with homosexuals, but with the military 
culture that is hostile toward them. Still another 
article suggested that shared experiences -- an important 
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concept in the self-categorical model of group cohesion --
could reshape service members' attitudes: "A heterosexual 
chief petty officer with 18 years of Navy service, said he 
had served on submarines with declared homosexuals who 
worked well with their shipmates," and that people would 
get used to serving with homosexuals (H5]. 
Self-categorical statements were utilized much more 
frequently to support the exclusionist stance. More than 
26 percent of the total number of statements were 
classified as exclusionist and self-categorical in 
character. These statements suggested that most service 
members loathed everything to do with homosexuality (H36], 
that homosexuals were a weak link due to ... homosexuality 
[H20], and that homosexuality is perceived as disgusting, 
sick and scary [H2]. Clearly such sentiments would 
function to isolate homosexual service members from 
heterosexual ones. Whether or not such beliefs are 
grounded in reality, they could certainly affect the 
cohesion of small units, because hatred of some members by 
others in the group prevents them from identifying with 
one another, a key to cohesion in the self-categorization 
model. 
A fairly large number of bureaucratic statements were 
employed to support the reformist stance. More than 19 
percent of the total number of statements fell into this 
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classification. They focused almost exclusively on the 
qualifications of individuals to fill certain jobs, and 
the ability of the military to enforce codes of conduct. 
Arguments included such statements as "if a gay person is 
the most qualified candidate, let her or him in" [H5], 
homosexuals should serve if they play by the rules [H26], 
and emphasis should be placed on behavior and conduct 
(H39] rather than sexual orientation. There were further 
suggestions that the military would solve its homosexual 
"problem" if violations of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice were investigated in an evenhanded manner without 
regard to whether the conduct was heterosexual or 
homosexual (H28], and if the practice of selective 
enforcement of rules was ended (H26]. The gist of the 
reformist bureaucratic rationale is that qualification and 
conduct should be the only criteria for enlisting and 
advancing service members. 
Very few exclusionist statements were classified as 
bureaucratic. They constituted only five percent of the 
total number of statements classified. The majority of 
these statements followed a circular argument, contending 
that because homosexuality is defined as "incompatible 
with military service" (DOD 1982), and homosexual acts are 
considered illegal conduct (H42] in the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (art. 125), homosexuality was by 
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definition against the rules, and homosexuals should 
therefore be excluded from the services. Further, 
attempts to change military policies to include homosexual 
service members would lead to court challenges (H41] and 
legal quagmires (H33]. One article pointed out that 
service members have fewer constitutional rights than 
civilians [H42], apparently in an attempt to justify the 
exclusion. Another article suggested that the exclusion 
functioned to protect gays from threats of violence within 
the services [H15]. Interestingly, no references were 
made to the qualifications of homosexual service members. 
The examination of the 353 statements regarding the 
military's discriminatory policies toward homosexuals 
(Table III) shows that a larger number of statements, 63.7 
percent, supported the reformist stance, despite the 
military's blatant hostility toward homosexuals. Factors 
which might help account for this historical and 
continuing hostility are outlined in the following 
sections. 
The Political Context 
During the 1992 presidential campaign, the political 
pendulum generally appeared to be taking a liberal swing. 
People had grown tired of a stagnant economy, which they 
blamed on 12 years of Republican administration, and the 
"family values" -- code words for rigid conservativism --
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which that administration espoused. Democratic candidate 
Bill Clinton, portraying himself as a "Kennedyesque" 
candidate of a new generation, promised change. 
The issue of homosexuals in the military might never 
have become a debate in the public domain if not for 
Clinton's presidential campaign promise to lift the ban on 
their military service. The promise was presumably 
intended to consolidate the political support of 
homosexuals, who in 1992 were becoming much more vocal and 
politically organized, and the support of women. Women 
and homosexuals both could relate to the institutionalized 
discrimination of the U.S. military, and both had much to 
gain from the liberalization of sexual norms. Had Clinton 
been successful in removing all limits on homosexuals' 
military service, new policies could have compelled 
service members to refrain from discriminating against 
them. 
Although lifting the ban on gays in the military was 
only a small part of Clinton's national agenda, resistance 
from the military, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
turned what could have been a simple change of military 
policy into a lightning rod for public debate. President 
Clinton, in only his first month of office, was now forced 
to contend with a "crisis" of his own making. Unable to 
lift the ban outright, the new president was eventually 
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forced to settle for a compromise which allowed 
homosexuals to serve as long as they hid their sexual 
orientation. The new policy, of course, did not greatly 
affect the everyday lives of gays in the military because 
they had already learned to act "straight" in order to 
protect their military careers. 
The Military Context 
Several factors within the military added to the 
hostility toward Clinton's proposal to lift the ban. 
First is the generally conservative culture of military 
people, who may have been deeply disappointed that Clinton 
had won the election in the first place. As a student in 
the 1960s, Clinton had visited the Soviet Union, a sworn 
enemy of the United States and an immediate military 
threat; he had protested the war in Vietnam (while living 
in Great Britain, no less); and he had allegedly used 
illegal drugs. Such activities would be an affront to the 
conformity, authoritarianism and nationalism embedded in 
military culture. 
The greatest offense, however, was the perception 
that Clinton's circumvention of military service in 
Vietnam was an attempt at "draft-dodging." In a culture 
where male toughness, bravery and sacrifice are highly 
valued, deferment from military service is viewed as 
nothing less than a cowardly attempt to shirk 
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responsibility. 
Adding injury to insult, defense budget increases 
that characterized the 1980s would now be replaced by deep 
defense cuts. Service members were forced to face the 
fact that their jobs were no longer "safe," that, in fact, 
competition for promotion would be much more fierce. Even 
retaining an old billet no longer depended on competence 
in that job-- the military would now actively purge as 
many "under-motivated" service members as possible through 
"attrition." The dreaded acceptance of homosexuals into 
the military only served to escalate fears of competition 
among service members, as well as to offend the embedded 
military culture. 
A Feminist Perspective 
The hyper-masculine culture of the U.S. military was 
discussed in the preceding section about women, but it 
should be addressed again here. Stereotypes about the 
effeminate gay male pervade military culture and strike 
fear in the hearts of service members, especially men. 
Anyone or anything not masculine enough is despised in 
this environment. Much of the hostility toward gays in 
the military is explained by Shilts (1993, p. 5-6): 
We are a nation in transition when it comes to 
attitudes toward gender roles and sexuality in 
general, and homosexuality in particular. 
Military service was once considered a rite of 
male passage .... In different ways, the 
presence of women and gays in the ranks 
challenges the traditional concept of manhood in 
the military, just as the emergence of women and 
gays in other fields has done so in society at 
large . 
... (T)he presence of gay men -- especially so 
many who are thoroughly competent for military 
service -- calls into question everything that 
manhood is supposed to mean. For both women and 
men, the story of gays in the military is a 
story about manhood. For generations, after 
all, the military has been an institution that 
has promised to do one thing, if nothing else, 
and that is to take a boy and make him a man. 
It is clear that traditional gender roles play a 
major part in military attitudes toward both "straight" 
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women and homosexuals of either sex. For women, however, 
the exclusion of homosexuals from the military has had 
even more insidious consequences than might at first be 
suspected. There exists much ambivalence about women's 
roles in the military because in order to do "men's jobs" 
proficiently, they must display at least some degree of 
masculinity, but at the same time they must display 
femininity to be "real" women. This leaves women in a 
position of having to prove both their job competence and 
their heterosexuality. This, in turn, leaves women 
extremely vulnerable to sexual harassment in the military. 
Again, Shilts (1993, p. 5) illustrates the point: 
There are many men who never wanted women in 
their Army or their Navy in the first place, and 
the military regulations regarding homosexuality 
have been the way to keep them out for the past 
decade. Until proven otherwise, women in the 
military are often suspected of being lesbian. 
Why else, the logic goes, would they want to 
join a man's world? ... If they are successful, 
they are suspect for not being womanly enough; 
if they fail, they are harassed for not being 
man enough to do the job. 
The way women can prove themselves to be 
nonlesbians is to have sex with men. Thus 
antigay regulations have encouraged sexual 
harassment of women. Those who will not 
acquiesce to a colleague's advances are 
routinely accused of being lesbian and are 
subject to discharge. Some women have allowed 
themselves to be raped by male officers, afraid 
that the alternative would be a charge of 
lesbianism. Those who do complain of sexual 
harassment often find themselves accused: Their 
commands are far more intrigued with 
investigating homosexuals than with 
investigating sexual harassment (emphasis in 
original). 
Thus, despite heterosexual male service members' 
fears of gay men in the military, women are much more 
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affected by the military's homosexual exclusion than are 
men. After all, homosexual men need only to be competent 
at "men's jobs" to display their masculinity, and 
therefore their heterosexuality. Women service members, 
on the other hand, face the paradox that technical job 
competence can threaten their military careers. This 
paradox, combined with the popular belief that a larger 
percentage of female service members are homosexual 
results in women being discharged for homosexuality at a 
much higher rate than are men: 
For years there has been great controversy 
over the fact that women are subjected to witch 
hunts more often than men. Overall, women 
comprise about one tenth of total military 
personnel, yet the percentages for females 
discharged are three or four times greater than 
those for males .... Of the Army's total 
discharges, 5 percent were enlisted gay men 
compared to 17 percent enlisted gay women. The 
Navy had 13 percent of enlisted men discharged 
for homosexuality and 27 percent of enlisted 
women. The Marine Corps discharged 4 percent of 
enlisted men for being gay and 33 percent of 
enlisted women .... The Air Force discharged 4.3 
percent of enlisted men for homosexuality and 10 
percent of enlisted women (Humphrey 1990, p. 
xxv) . 
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The indication is that women's status in the military 
is inextricably linked to the status of homosexuals, 
whatever the sexual orientation of women service members. 
That service members' preoccupation with homosexuality 
seems at first to be directed toward males may be a simple 
function of the fact that most service members are male, 
and, therefore, the presence of homosexual men is the most 
immediate threat-- both physically (from sexual assaults) 
and psychically (from sexual ambiguity) . 
Another observation may reveal that the hostility of 
"straight" male service members toward homosexuals is 
related to a perceived threat to gender relations. For 
example, male homosexuals are perceived by heterosexual 
male service members as refusing to condemn femininity or 
subjugate women. This perceived lack of masculinity is 
viewed as a weakness which reflects upon other males in 
the services. On the other hand, homosexuality among 
women is viewed as a rejection of men and men's important 
role as protectors. Therefore the independence of 
119 
lesbians from men threatens masculinity by making it less 
crucial, or even important. 
Perhaps the greatest of all dangers, perceived only 
in the subconscious, is the fact that sexual orientation 
is not a visible trait. Homosexuals in the military can 
generate sexual identity crises among heterosexual service 
members, especially young males who are trying to 
establish their masculine identity, in a way that is not 
possible for racial minorities and women. This is because 
a heterosexual white male knows he is not black, just as 
he knows he is not female. But there is nothing about 
himself which will let him know that he is not a 
homosexual. 
SUMMARY 
A comparison of the data pertaining to the three 
outgroups examined shows that a large majority of 
statements, 60 percent, supported the reformist stance. 
Despite past and current recalcitrance on the part of the 
military when confronted with such issues, discussions of 
exclusionist military policies in the media generally 
reflect support for reform. 
Nearly 40 percent of statements, the largest number 
in any cell, employed the ideological rationale in support 
of the reformist stance. This illustrates the importance 
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of "American values," and appeals to fairness and justice 
when dealing with equal opportunity (and the lack thereof) 
in the military. Ideological statements do not address 
the problem of human relations at the small-unit level. 
TABLE IV 
SUMMARY TABLE OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF 653 STATEMENTS 
FAVORING AND/OR OPPOSING DISCRIMINATORY POLICIES 
IN THE U.S. MILITARY 
STANCE 
Exclusionist Reformist 
I 
Total 
RATIONALE n ( % ) n ( % ) n ( % ) 
Ideological 34 ( 5. 2) 259 (39.7) 293 (44.9) 
Interdependence 10 ( 1. 5) 15 (2.3) 25 ( 3. 8) 
Self-Categorical 144 (22.1) 19 (2.9) 163 (25.0) 
Bureaucratic 71 (10.9) 101 (15.4) 172 (26.3) 
I Total II 259 (39.7) I 394 (60.3) II 653 (100.0) 
I 
I 
The use of these statements does not suggest that small 
group cohesion will be unaffected by the inclusion of 
outgroups, just that fairness and equal treatment of 
people are more important. 
The reformist stance relied on the bureaucratic 
rationale as its next strongest source of support. Again, 
this model ignores the reality of interpersonal relations 
at the small-unit level. Instead it focuses on merit and 
qualification of individuals, who then become akin to 
interchangeable parts with other people who hold the same 
qualifications. 
The reformist stance made very little use of the 
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interdependent or self-categorical rationales. The two 
combined were only slightly more than five percent of the 
total number of statements. The reformist stance, then, 
most frequently relied for support on ideas that ignore 
the problem of small-unit cohesion in the military. 
Instead, the focus is on fairness and meritocratic 
treatment of people. 
As expected, the exclusionist stance claimed threats 
to small-unit cohesion, relying in particular upon the 
self-categorical model for support. Twenty-two percent of 
the total number of statements, the largest number in 
support of the exclusionist stance, employed the self-
categorical statements. Exclusionists apparently 
recognized the fact that people's ability to bond to 
others in their primary group affects their ability to 
perform their function in the organization. Some people's 
inability to identify with other people because of their 
categorical differences causes divisions within the group 
and compromises cohesion and group function. 
The next most often used rationale in support of the 
exclusionist stance came from the bureaucratic model. One 
possible explanation for this is that there is, in fact, 
evidence that racial minorities and women achieve lower 
scores than the white male majority on standardized tests 
given by the military, which would justify exclusionary 
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policies. For example, women are generally smaller than 
men, possess less muscle mass -- especially in the upper 
body -- and are unable, on the average, to run as fast as 
men. This fact is easily quantifiable on standardized 
physical fitness tests. Physical strength and speed are 
prerequisites for some jobs in the military, and given 
that women's strength and speed are generally less than 
men's, this bureaucratic requirement has been used to 
justify barring all women from competing for particular 
jobs. A similar circumstance affects black military 
recruits when their Armed Services Vocational Aptitude 
Battery (ASVAB) scores are compared to those of whites. 
Whites achieve significantly higher average ASVAB scores 
(Binkin and Eitelberg, 1982 p. 97), providing empirical 
"evidence" that whites are more qualified for particular 
jobs and promotions than blacks. This "evidence" has been 
used in the past to justify discriminatory policies 
affecting racial minorities. 
The exclusionist stance employed very few ideological 
or interdependent statements as a basis of support. 
Statements fitting into these two rationales constituted 
less than seven percent of the total number of statements. 
The majority of these, 5.2 percent, were ideological 
arguments, usually citing military tradition as a reason 
not to change the status quo. 
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The exclusionist position, then, relied mostly upon 
self-categorical justifications for excluding outgroups 
from military service. It is suggested that outgroups 
should be excluded because the majority of service members 
simply do not like them. This rationale confirms one of 
the original assumptions of this thesis-- that arguments 
supporting the exclusion of outgroups would be couched in 
the language of small group theory, in this case, as a 
threat to unit cohesion based on the self-categorization 
of service members. However, the rationale completely 
ignores Merton's (1976) point that prejudicial feelings 
toward others do not necessarily lead to discrimination. 
Exclusionary policies were further supported by the 
bureaucratic rationale, with suggestions that whole 
categories of people were generally not qualified to hold 
particular jobs in the military. This rationale instills 
in the exclusionist stance an appearance of meritocracy, 
without addressing the possibility that the military's 
standardized exams might be designed to favor particular 
categories of people. 
A breakdown of the distribution of statements among 
the three groups examined (Table V below) shows that there 
are similar patterns in rationale used for each case. 
TABLE V 
SUMMARY TABLE OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF 653 STATEMENTS FAVORING AND OPPOSING 
DISCRIMINATORY POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY 
STANCE BY OUTGROUP BY RATIONALE 
EXCLUSIONIST REFORMIST 
RACIAL WOMEN HOMO- RACIAL WOMEN HOMO- TOTAL 
MINORITY SEXUALS MINORITY SEXUALS 
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
IDEO- 6 14 14 57 70 132 293 
LOGICAL {0.9) { 2 .1) { 2. 1) {8.7) {10.7) {20.2) {44.7) 
INTER- 6 2 2 0 0 15 25 
DEPENDENT (0.9) (0.3) (.0. 3) (0.0) (0.0) (2.3) ( 3.8) 
SELF- 10 40 94 7 3 9 163 
CATEGORICAL ( 1. 5) ( 6. 1) (14.4) (1.1) (0.5) (1.4) (25.0) 
BUREAU- 4 49 18 7 25 69 172 
CRATIC (0.6) (7. 5) (2.8) (1.1) (3. 8) (10.6) (26.4) 
TOTAL 26 105 128 71 98 225 653 
(3. 9) (16.0) (19.6) (10.9) (15.0) (34.5) (99.9)* 
* Error due to rounding 
...... 
f'J 
~ 
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The exclusionist stance most frequently employed 
self-categorical statements, except in the case of women, 
in which bureaucratic statements were used slightly more 
often than self-categorical statements. Least used was 
the interdependent rationale, except in the case of racial 
minorities in which bureaucratic statements were least 
used. 
For all three outgroups, the reformist stance relied 
most heavily upon ideological appeals to equality and 
fairness for support, and relied next most often upon the 
bureaucratic model, except in the case of racial 
minorities for which bureaucratic and self-categorical 
statements were used in equal numbers. Least used in 
support of the reformist stance were interdependent 
statements, except in the case of homosexuals, for which 
self-categorical statements were used least. 
An important aspect of the distribution of statements 
is the unequal numbers of statements concerning each of 
the three outgroups. Frequencies of statements might be 
used as an indication of the level of controversy 
surrounding each group. 
For example, the issue of racial desegregation of the 
military generated only 97 statements drawn from only 31 
New York Times articles over a period of two years, the 
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time limit set in the research methodology (for further 
discussion, see Chapter III -- Methodology). However, the 
issue of women in combat or subject to the draft generated 
203 statements from 50 New York Times articles (the 
maximum number allowed by the research methodology) in a 
space of only 700 days. This suggests that the issues of 
women in combat or subject to the draft were more 
controversial than the issue of racial desegregation in 
the military. 
The proposal to lift the ban on military service by 
homosexuals produced 353 statements drawn from 50 New York 
Times articles published in a space of only 98 days. 
These data were gathered from a much smaller window of 
time than was required for either racial minorities or 
women. Further, the articles concerning homosexuals 
produced more statements than the number of statements 
concerning racial minorities and women combined. This 
suggests that the issue of homosexuals in the military is 
a far more controversial issue than the military service 
of racial minorities or women. 
Another important aspect concerning the distribution 
of statements is that it shows that precedence, in this 
case the change of policy to remove institutionalized 
discrimination against one outgroup, does not mean that 
other outgroups will be more readily accepted in the 
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future. Laymen's logic may dictate that racial 
desegregation of the military should have made the 
acceptance of women less difficult, and that the 
acceptance of women, in turn, should have made the 
acceptance of homosexuals less difficult. The data show 
that just the opposite is true. For each successive 
outgroup, greater numbers of statements supporting and 
opposing discriminatory policies in the military were 
found in shorter time periods. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The United States military, the most powerful 
fighting force in the world, is viewed by some Americans 
as vulnerable to destruction from within. The destruction 
would not come from espionage or violence, they fear, but 
rather from social change. 
Members of the military organization derive much 
status in society from the "military mystique," the idea 
that service members are an elite group. Service members 
are thought of as brave, tough, well-disciplined, heroic, 
patriotic, physically fit and willing to die for American 
ideals. Such characteristics are highly valued, and 
happily attributed to the American ideal "boy next door." 
However, it appears that great offense is taken by many 
people, both inside and outside the military services, if 
the "boy next door" is not the white male heterosexual 
they envisioned. Perhaps it is too difficult to attribute 
the high-status military mystique to less valued groups of 
people-- racial minorities, women and homosexuals. 
Categorical distinctions between people in the 
military remain important despite the military's best 
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effort to strip away people's individualism, and to make 
such distinctions irrelevant. Recognizing this fact has 
given credibility to those who favor excluding whole 
categories of people from service in an attempt to avoid 
small-unit disruptions based upon such distinctions. 
Exclusionists recognize that the military's rigid 
bureaucratic roles and standards of behavior-- and even 
its body of criminal law designed to enforce such 
standards, may not save it from the social reality that 
some categories of people are more favored than others, 
and that service members may treat each other accordingly. 
Reformists, on the other hand, largely ignore the 
issue of small-unit cohesion. They point out that 
American ideals of freedom and equal opportunity are so 
important that they cannot be disregarded in any social 
context -- not even in the military -- and that protecting 
these ideals could be accomplished through reform of 
military policy and strict enforcement of rules of 
conduct. Modified rules of conduct, combined with strict 
enforcement, could then allow the military to demand non-
discriminatory behavior among service members. Failure to 
follow such rules could result in disciplinary action 
ranging from verbal reprimand to execution. 
Even though this ideological argument avoids the 
issue of small-group interaction, the reformist stance has 
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generated wider support than exists for the exclusionist 
stance, as illustrated in the news media. The data 
suggest that ideology is a very powerful motivating force 
for change. 
The fact that ideological arguments have shaped the 
military despite neglecting the issue of small-group 
interaction is evidenced in the fact that the military has 
changed. Racial minorities are no longer segregated from 
whites; rather they are included in all services, jobs and 
ranks without race-based limitations. Women are now part 
of the regular services and are allowed to achieve any 
rank without limitation. Although they are still exempt 
from registration for the draft and barred from 
competition for many combat-related jobs, military women 
find more and more opportunities are open to them. Women 
are allowed to serve aboard combat ships and aircraft, 
compete in non-segregated service academies, and they 
receive combat training along with men in non-segregated 
basic training units. Homosexuals have been acknowledged 
as assets to the military, as long as they do not draw 
attention to their sexual orientation or engage in 
unlawful behavior. Simple acknowledgement in this case is 
viewed as another first step toward reform. 
Even if racial minorities, women and homosexuals are 
not the ideal "boys next door," it has been proved through 
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experience that their presence is more beneficial than 
detrimental to the overall function of the U.S. military. 
Further, bestowing some of the "military mystique" upon 
these social outgroups might help to elevate their status 
in the larger society. 
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